Page 14 - Constitutional Model for a Democratic South Africa By Prof Vuyisle Dlova

A federal or quasi-federal structure has also the added advantage of freeing the national
government from attendance to local details so that it can devote its energies to those matters
that are of importance to the nation. It would also keep the local people busy, governing
themselves, and in that way, share in the successes and failures of central government.

It could however be pointed out by some that the advantages enunciated above do not
necessitate such a fundamental change in the structure of government as the one suggested
here. And that a devolved government would achieve the same result with far less fuss. In
answer to that we may only say that what in essence we are advocating here is exactly such
a devolved government. However the only distinction with classical devolution is that our
devolved model has to be constitutionally sacrosanct or entrenched; we call it regionalism or
quasi-federalism in order to protect it from casual scrapping in response to short-term populist
pressures or as a result of the caprice of leaders who may be impatient with criticism by local
interests groups.

Delimitation of internal boundaries

Detailed recommendations on such issues as delimitation of regional boundaries could be a
subject for commissions appointed for that purpose. However some broad views are offered
here on what guidelines could be the basis for the work of such commissions.

In delimiting regional boundaries in South Africa, it would be important, as far as possible, to
ensure that there are no large disparities between regions on such basic matter, as size,
population and perhaps arable or reclaimable land. This does not mean there should be
rigidity, larger size could at times compensate for poor land, scarcity of rain or relative sparsity
of population.

Efforts would have to be made to break up in advance potentially large concentrations of
regional power that could tend to rival national power. This could mean, for instance, the
breaking up of the larger nationalities into at least more than one region. Ethnicity however
should not be made a basis for creation of regions or delimiting boundaries between them.

Where on the other hand there is a history of bitter rivalries and hostilities it may not be wise
to lump the groups in question together. Finally, the present provincial boundaries would also
have to be ignored in the mapping out of regions.

Division of powers between the Federal / National and the Regional Governments.

The division of power suggested here is based on a broad classification in which local issues,
or issues with purely local implication are to be within the exclusive competence of regional
authorities while issues of national concern or with ramifications transcending the region
would be the exclusive legislative preserve of the national government.

In order to ensure more certainty the device, widely used in constitutional practice of federal
states, of listing legislative issues that are within the competence of the national or the
regional government is also recommended here. In this regard two lists could be drawn: one
for issues exclusive to the national government, and the other for issues within the exclusive
legislative competence of the regional governments. Anything not included in either list could
be deemed concurrent to both. There should however be an express proviso to the effect
that an enactment by the national government on an unlisted and therefore concurrent issue
precludes regional governments from legislating on the same issues.