Page 16 - Constitutional Model for a Democratic South Africa By Prof Vuyisle Dlova

ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT

The presidency

In our model, we reject the separation of the institution of head of state from that of head of
government. Our main reason is not that the Westminster model is not suitable for a federal
structure, indeed the Indian experience dispels any such notion. The preference for executive
presidency is rooted in the African experience, and in particular, the tensions and crises that
have attended the practice of having a non-executive and supposedly neutral head of state. It
would not be going too far to suggest that the dwindling species of neutral men, of head of
state calibre, is almost extinct in Africa.

We propose therefore an executive president accountable to Parliament. To achieve this
objective, the president could be elected by members of parliament, constituted into an
electoral college for that purpose, whenever a vacancy has occurred in the office of
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president. The term of office of the president would coincide with the life of a parliament but
he would have to continue after dissolution until the new parliament elects its president. A
president would not serve more than two terms.

The reason for our preference for a president elected by parliament and not directly is that it
would ensure that the president is also a member and almost invariably the leader of the
majority party. This could lessen possibility of tension between him and parliament. The fact
that he is elected by parliament could also ensure that he “tries to” retain its confidence in all
actions.

The legislative

The two house arrangement, common in federal constitutions, is also recommended here.
The principle of majority rule should be strictly adhered to, in the main legislative house. This
could be done by dividing the country into single member constituencies and ensuring as far
as possible that population figures be the main criterion in the delimitation of constituency
boundaries.

In order however to safeguard the interest of smaller regions the principle of minimum
representation in the main representative house is also recommended. To further buttress
regional interests, there should be equal suffrage for all regions in the senate or the Council of
Regions as it may be called in our model. Bills should be passed by both houses before they
are sent for the president’s signature. If there be a conflict between the two houses, then a
joint sitting can be called and the majority of those present and voting should be enough for
the passage of a bill. It is however important that the members of the Senate house should
not exceed one third of the lower house.

With regards to the so-called money bills, that is, bills appropriating revenue or money or
imposing taxes, a time limit, not exceeding perhaps two weeks, could be set for the
acceptance by the senate of such Bills. The purpose of such provisions is obvious, namely,
to ensure that the representatives of the majority are not unduly hindered in the exercise of
the business of legislating for the good government and well being of the nation.