Page 14 - Chinese SIlver By Adrien Von Ferscht

destined for China. It is not by coincidence that the Chinese Export Silver manufacturing
period began in 1785. However, between the years 1810-1820, there was a serious
decline in Mexican output amounting to a drop of over 50% in the amount of mined silver;
the cause was the civil chaos resulting from the strive for independence in Mexico. This
not only reduced the amount of silver available for China to acquire but it had serious
implications on established trades other nations had with China, for example the tea and
silk trade that Britain generated. Britain now had far less silver available to fulfil its needs.
Less silver in Britain drove up the price of fine silver wares produced by English and
Scottish silversmiths and the ripple effect of this caused a steep rise in demand for silver
wares from Canton. Despite its own shortages, China had far more available bullion than
Britain or any other country on earth, Chinese silversmiths demanded a fraction of the
price of a London or Birmingham silversmith and the quality of Canton craftsmanship was
on a par with the best in Britain. With Chinese silversmiths demanding only a fraction of
the price asked by London or Birmingham silversmiths, the economic reasons for the rise
in Chinese production of neo-classical “Georgian” silver wares is clear.

British merchants in Canton knew this, so did the ever-wily sea captains. This, therefore, is
the main reason why we are aware of so much Chinese silver made in this period in the
neo-classical “Georgian” style. It is this combined dynamic that caused such an outpouring
of pseudo-English silver from Canton to Britain and to Massachusetts Bay in America.

However, this reality was not necessarily how it was portrayed in China. While the decline
in South American raw silver production did have a negative effect on the imbalance of
payments, there was also the parallel phenomenon of a steep rise in the “requirement” of
opium in China. As a result, opium presented a convenient scapegoat for the Imperial
court to blame for all its woes. The Qing Dynasty was trying desperately against all odds
to stay in power yet the Emperor was increasingly more helpless and embarrassed at the
fast declining economy. The Qing court had an underlying fault line that plagued the entire
period of the dynasty. While China’s population grew exponentially, the size of the
governing court had always been unrealistically small; 1834 saw China’s population edge
past the 400 million mark. The Qing did not have an effective administrative infrastructure
to manage its population and the geographical remoteness of its northern capital left it six
weeks arduous journey away from where the China Trade was actually happening in the
south at Canton.

The ‘fanqui’ [foreign devils] presented the Qing with a perfect scapegoat. The resultant
splits within the Imperial Court, the incessant pressure from the British government and a
Chinese navy that was unfit for purpose against what was then a state-of-the-art British
fleet culminated in defeat for China in the first Opium War.

The resultant Treaty of Nanking in 1842 changed the trading landscape of China forever
and brought shame on the Chinese nation. The Qing retaliated by laying the blame solely
on opium; the diminished silver equation was conveniently eradicated from the annals of
Chinese history.

The dynamic didn’t end there, though. From 1855 onwards, the supply of silver bullion
began a speedy recovery and from 1856 and over the next 30 years, the Chinese
economy was firmly back in the black despite an unprecedented rise in demand for opium
- a fact that should have placed a question mark over the plausibility of laying blame solely
on opium.