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traditional political parties, the protest not the first protest march since the is the constancy of the protesters’
movement’s support for the FFC Revolution, it was novel in that the support for the prime minister. This
declined apace. prime minister declined to meet them faith bought the government time and
The result is that the FFC political for the politically symbolic reception space to right the listing ship of state
parties cannot claim the mass of their pleas, which is his usual gesture in the trying period following the
representational power of the protest of respect and equality. A second Revolution. While this faith endured
movement. This in turn calls into precedent followed, adding insult its most recent test, it may not survive
question the governance powers they to injury, when the security forces further trials.
have arrogated unto themselves. Still, But this week’s peace agreement
international policymakers tend to could help guide the ship to port. The
make the mistake of conflating the agreement incorporates Sudan’s armed
Base and the FFC’s traditional parties, movements into the transitional
treating the latter like a traditional government, which is a much-needed
governing party that represents the success for the prime minister. More
Base. importantly, the next steps it envisages
The prime minister is a separate create an opportunity to reorganize
actor, because of the way the protest Sudanese politics along lines that
movement view him. From the outset better reflect the true political forces
the protesters harboured reservations General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan - Sudan’s in the country.
about the FFC, the military, and even Sovereign Council Chairman A national constitutional conference is
the entire transitional constitutional envisaged as the next stage in the peace
arrangement. As the transition period turned aggressive, tear-gassing the process. Approached correctly, it could
has sputtered, their antipathy towards demonstrators and dispersing them serve as a new way of incorporating the
all of these has grown. But Hamdouk is with force. Gone was the restrained protest movement into some form of
in a category apart. tolerance that has characterized the renewed national compact. Moreover,
Firstly, because as the linchpin of the post-Revolution responses to protests. it might address the paradox at the
civilian component of the government, Sensing an opportunity, the military heart of the protest movement: that
were the protest movement to make made a bid for the allegiance of the it is both the most representational
him the target of their demonstrations, protest movement in a speech by political force but also unwilling to
the military would have grounds General Burhan, the head of the engage in party politics.
to oust him, claiming the loss of military component of the transitional Were it a political party, it would
his popular mandate. Secondly, he government. Sudanese read these eclipse the extant parties and
is in a category apart because of statements with alarm as paving the dominate elections. Instead, the
his character: he has managed to way for a dramatic move from the protest movement creates momentum
convince the protest movement of military. The gambit duly backfired, that other, established forces then
his ‘genuineness’, particularly in as the protesters, despite their anger surf upon. Addressing this paradox
contrast to the traditional political towards the prime minister, reflexively is the real key to securing the civilian
parties within the FFC. Since the doubled down in their support for him
overwhelmingly dominant political to rule out any ambiguity about their character of Sudan’s transformation.
force in the country is the protest attitude towards a military coup. The prime minister should therefore
movement, the connection between The economy itself was always shaky make leadership of this process a
prime minister and the protesters is but has now begun a steeper slide, personal priority with an eye to using
life-sustaining for the former. It makes as seen with the fall of the Sudanese it to bind the protest movement closer.
him untouchable by the military (or pound’s US dollar exchange rate, If left to others to lead, it will devolve
even the FFC) for fear of the popular continuing fuel scarcity, and the into yet another political football
backlash that would be released. resultant dramatic increase in the between government factions.
But amid growing tensions around cost of living. In parallel, the security Interested international partners
the plummeting economy this link situation is fraying around the edges do not need to lead this mediation.
recently strained to near breaking. with old rivalries breaking out with Indeed, the protest movement’s caution
A misstep by the prime minister did new virulence. Unchecked by the extends towards foreign intervention.
more to threaten that bond then any distracted central state’s military But the transitional government, and
governing shortcomings to date, organs, hundreds of dead are strewn the prime minister, is alive to what key
imperilling the ‘genuineness’ that across Sudan’s peripheries. In short, international partners say and do.
endears him to the street. on an objective scale, conditions now
On 17 August 2020, Sudanese are worse than those that birthed the -The author is an Expert & Staff
protesters marched to deliver demands protests undoing Bashir. at European Council of Foreign
for reform to Hamdouk. Though The difference between then and now Relations

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