Page 74 - bne monthly magazine June 2024 Russian Despair Index

74 Opinion
with Armenia and its neighbours realistically. He genuinely
wants to solve problems.
Armenia's strategic perspective is to join the European Union and establish strong military-political relations with the US. Resolving problems with Azerbaijan and Turkey will make Armenia's strategic turn towards the West more feasible.
The West is ready to embrace Armenia as part of its family if it does not have hot conflicts with its neighbours. I think Washington and Brussels have conveyed this message to Yerevan.
Pashinyan's government has calculated that after signing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, Turkey will open the Armenian- Turkish border, diplomatic relations will be established, and significant economic interactions will begin.
The signing of a peace treaty with Azerbaijan would be a major achievement for Pashinyan's government. It would allow him to prove to the citizens of Armenia that the "era of peace" is truly beginning after decades of war (which was Pashinyan's pre-election promise).
Unpopular concessions
At this stage, Azerbaijan will not return the 200 to 300 sq km of Armenian territory it has occupied. Despite the one-sided logic of the process, Pashinyan has nevertheless agreed to withdraw Armenian troops from the four villages on the border of Armenia’s Tavush and Azerbaijani Kazakh regions.
The inhabitants of Kirants, Voskepar, and Baghanis villages are particularly nervous about this fact, as they will have
to communicate with the Azerbaijani armed forces from a closer distance. Villagers currently regularly block interstate and community roads, complaining about the Pashinyan government's decision.
Pashinyan has calculated that by starting the border demarcation process with Azerbaijan based on the Alma- Ata declaration the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border would become stable. According to him, Azerbaijan will be deprived of the opportunity to create false grounds for military attacks against Armenia. Additionally, one of the most difficult problems preventing the conclusion of the Armenian-Azerbaijani contract will be solved with the start of the demarcation process.
Pashinyan is trying to prove that he is ready to take painful and risky steps for the sake of signing a peace agreement. He also hopes to receive the support of the USA and the EU, thus gaining partners in deterring Azerbaijan's military attacks.
However, Pashinyan's romantic aspirations to make the peace treaty a reality collide with the regional plans of Ilham Aliyev and Vladimir Putin.
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Azerbaijan’s reasons to avoid peace
In the last four years, Azerbaijan has occupied 200 to 300 sq km of territory of Armenia by military attacks. In January 2024, Aliyev admitted to the Azerbaijani media that he had occupied heights bordering Armenia. According to him, positioning troops at the heights gives him a chance to control the movement of the Armenian armed forces.
If Azerbaijan, after receiving the four villages, continues
to use the Alma-Ata declaration as a basis for border demarcation, Baku would logically be forced to withdraw these troops from Armenia. By retreating from the territory of Armenia, Azerbaijan would lose its superior position over the Armenian armed forces.
To avoid this scenario, Azerbaijan may abandon the Alma Ata declaration after receiving the four villages. Azerbaijan will likely introduce new principles, try to invoke fake maps in the process of border demarcation and demand the recognition of Azerbaijani sovereignty over the Armenian heights.
Since international specialists do not participate in
the border demarcation process, there is a big risk that Azerbaijan will threaten war and again force Armenia to accept the rules of its game.
It seems unlikely that Aliyev, who preaches "Armenian hatred" to Azerbaijan society, will return the occupied territories to Armenia. This could block the signing of a peace treaty.
Prolonging Aliyev's regime
Secondly, the internal political realities of Azerbaijan also support not signing a peace agreement. For almost 20 years, Aliyev has built his power around the goal of defeating the external enemy, Armenia. Armenia has been portrayed as an occupier, and defeating it has become the national ideology of Azerbaijan. Propaganda of hatred towards Armenians is state policy in Azerbaijan. A leader "sitting on a victorious horse" cannot yield to a "defeated enemy". Unfortunately, this idea prevails among the political elite and society of Azerbaijan.
The motivation to protect Azerbaijan's citizens from the military aggression of "enemy Armenians" ensures the consolidation of Azerbaijani society around the Aliyev regime.
Having hostile relations with Armenia is necessary for the president of Azerbaijan to protect and extend his regime. Aliyev reportedly won more than 90% of the votes in the last presidential pseudo elections thanks to the victory against the Karabakh Armenians and the realisation of his dream of revenge.
By signing a peace treaty with Armenia and building real peace, Aliyev would lose the tool to consolidate his regime. Why should Aliyev risk the future management of his dynasty in Azerbaijan?