Page 202 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

Notes to Pages 93–98 187

49 . This observation is based on a survey of evening news on five television stations and
print coverage in six national newspapers from January to May 1999.

50 . This figure is based on an estimate of 112 million votes cast. Seth Mydans, “Delays
Mount in Indonesia Vote Count,” NYT , June 27, 1999. The number of registered voters

(127.6 million) is based on KPU figures. “KIPP Records 19,504 Violations,” JP , July 10, 1999.
51 . Carter was quoted in a number of articles at the time. “Carter Group Sees ‘Festival
of Democracy’ in Indonesia,” Kyodo News Service, June 9, 1999; Indira Lakshmanan, “Carter
Gives a Good Grade to Indonesian Free Election,” Boston Globe , June 9, 1999; “Japan Hails
Indonesian Polls as Free and Fair,” AFP, June 9, 1999; “Indonesia Poll Free and Fair: Japan’s
Top Monitor,” Jiji Press Ticker Service, June 9, 1999; “Indon Election Free, Fair and a Triumph,
Downer Declares,” AAP Newsfeed, June 8, 1999; “Observers, Officials Say Indonesian Elections

Free, Fair,” Xinhua News Agency, June 8, 1999; “A Big Step for Indonesia,” LAT , June 9, 1999.
52 . “Asian Observers Say Indonesian Polls Free Except in East Timor, Aceh,” AFP, June 10,
1999.
53 . These figures exclude violations in Aceh and East Timor. Atika Shubert, “Indonesia

Tally Delayed Again amid Charges of Voter Fraud,” JP/IHT , June 10, 1999. The number of poll-
ing stations is taken from “Komisi Pemilihan Umum,” in the International Press Information
Kit distributed at the JOMC, Aryaduta Hotel, Jakarta, May 18, 1999.
54 . “Some Areas Demand that Polls Be Repeated,” JP , June 10, 1999.
55 . Ibid.
56 . “Delays Plague Provincial Ballot Counts,” JP , June 29, 1999.
57 . “Observations on the Elections,” anonymous submission to Joyo News Service, June
14, 1999, http//:www.asia-pacific solidarity.net/southeastasia/indonesia/netnews/1999/
and24_v3.htm#More%20reports%20on%20poll%20violations%20fl ow%20in.
58 . “How They Share the 462 DPR seats,” JP , July 16, 1999; “Vote Gained by Top Five Par-
ties for DPR,” press release, JOMC, 6:02 p.m.–8:17 p.m., July 14, 1999.
59 . “Some Areas Demand.”
60 . “Money Politics,” editorial, JP , May 12, 1999. Further evidence of misappropriation
came out in later scandals, such as Buloggate II. Bill Guerin, “Indonesia Prepares Black Sheep
for Sacrifi ce,” AT , October 26, 2001.
61 . John McBeth, “Unpopular Decision: Election Overseers Allow Party Leaders to Decide
Who Wins,” FEER , May 6, 1999.
62 . Reports from the General Election Commission’s Joint Operations Media Center rein-
forced this impression. For example, its report on June 15 projected that PDIP, with 35.5 per-
cent of the popular vote, would win 139 seats, while Golkar, with only 20.7 percent, would
capture just 99 seats. “Indonesian Election: PDI-P Ahead with 58% Votes Counted,” press
release, JOMC, June 15, 1999.
63 . The Golkar-dominated Irian Jaya received thirteen seats for its population of two mil-
lion, while the opposition-party stronghold of Jakarta was allocated only eighteen seats for its
population of ten million—meaning there was one seat for every 282,000 registered voters in
Jakarta versus one seat for every 77,000 in Irian Jaya. “How They Share.” See also “Vote Gained
by Top Five Parties for DPR,” press release, JOMC, 6:02 p.m.–8:17 p.m., June 14, 1999.
64 . See, for example, Robert Caro’s description of how Lyndon Johnson won the 1948 US
Senate race by holding back his tallies in the machine-controlled Rio Grande Valley until he
knew his opponent’s total and then trumping him with late reports. Robert A. Caro, The Years of
Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent (London: Bodley Head, 1990), 181–91, 264–67, 307–17.
65 . “Vote Gained by Top Five Parties for DPR,” press release, JOMC, 7:20 a.m.–4:18 p.m.,
June 10, 1999.
66 . Ibid.
67 . “Vote Gained by Top Five Parties for DPR,” press release, JOMC, 6:02 p.m.–8:17 p.m.,
June 14, 1999.
68 . Based on the 1999 election law (UU No. 3/1999) and detailed in a National Election
Commission decree (Surat Keputusan KPU No. 40/1999), the imbalanced electoral system
gave each province one seat for every 450,000 residents and automatically granted an additional
seat to all Level II voting districts in each province ( kabupaten and kotamadya , or “regencies” and
“townships”), regardless of population. Thus, dozens of regencies and townships in the less
populous outer islands, versus almost none in Java and Bali, gained added value per vote. This
electoral logic, as veteran observer Aristides Katoppo later affi rmed, allowed pro-Golkar forces