Page 113 - TPA - A Peace Officer's Guide to Texas Law 2015

The focus of the States argument has been on its claim that §822.013 is solely a civil statute, but to the
extent that the States argument can be taken as a claim that the language of §42.092 specifically excludes the
application of §822.013 as a defense to the offense of cruelty to nonlivestock animals, much of our discussion
above answers that claim as well. To those answers we would add one more: If we assume that §822.013 is at
least partly a criminal statute that provides a defense to some criminal prosecutions, the legislature could have
made clear that §822.013 was not a defense to a prosecution for cruelty to non-livestock animals, if that was its
intent, by including a provision that explicitly excludes the application of §822.013, or of matters described in
that section, as a defense.

After examining the text and history of §822.013 and other relevant statutes, we conclude that
§822.013(a) provides a defense to criminal prosecution and that such a defense can be raised in a prosecution
under §42.092(b)(6).

Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

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Chase v. State, Ct. Crim. Appeals, No. PD-1768-13, Nov. 19 , 2014.

ELEMENTS BANK ROBBERY ENHANCEMENT

U.S.C. 2113(e) provides: Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding or
attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense forces any person to accompany him
without the consent of such person, shall be imprisoned not less than ten years, or if death results shall be
punished by death or life imprisonment. (Emphasis added.)

Whitfield, fleeing police after a botched bank robbery, entered the home of 79-year-old Mary Parnell
through an unlocked door. Once inside, he encountered a terrified Parnell and guided her from the hallway to a
computer room (between 4 and 9 feet away). Parnell suffered a fatal heart attack. Whitfield fled, and was found
hiding nearby where he was arrested. After a jury convicted him, Whitfield appealed and challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that §2113(e) requires substantial movement, and that his movement with
Parnell did not qualify. In an attempt to support his position that accompany should be read to mean
accompany over a substantial distance, Whitfield observes that a forced-accompaniment conviction carries
severe penalties: a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. In
1934, a forced-accompaniment conviction could even be punished with death.

But it does not seem to us that the danger of a forced accompaniment varies with the distance traversed.
Consider, for example, a hostage-taker s movement of one of his victims a short distance to a window, where she
would be exposed to police fire; or his use of the victim as a hu man shield as he approaches the door. And even
if we thought otherwise, we would have no authority to add a limitation the statute plainly does not contain. The
Congress that wrote this provision may well have had most prominently in mind John Dillinger s driving off with
hostages, but it enacted a provision which goes well beyond that. It is simply not in accord with English usage
to give accompany a meaning that covers only large distances.

Whitfield also contends that accompany must be read narrowly in light of §2113s graduated penalty
scheme. Therefore, he says, unless accompany is limited to forced movement over substantial distances, nearly
all §2113 violations will be punishable under subsection (e), making subsections (a) and (d) pointless. We
disagree. Even if Whitfield is right that bank robbers always exert some control over others, it does not follow
that they always force others to accompany them somewhere that is, to go somewhere with them. As we have
no reason to think that to be the case, and because subsections (a), (d), and (e) all cover distinct conduct, our
interpretation of accompany does not make any part of §2113 superfluous.

We hold that a bank robber forces [a] person to accompany him, for purposes of §2113(e), when he
forces that person to go somewhere with him, even if the movement occurs entirely within a single building or

A Peace Officer’s Guide to Texas Law 106 2015 Edition