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The topography of composing work  41

            composition. Through their action-structuring effect, these objects create an
            objectivised counterpart, almost a partner in an interaction, which makes the
            composers’ composing visible, audible and tangible for them – in short: dis-
            coverable to the senses. Alongside their useful function as tools, musical
            instruments, computers and writing materials also develop a creative-epis-
            temic function in the context of certain actions – for example, the sensory and
            experimental handling of instruments or different kinds of paper.


            1.4 Immaterial objects: discourses, notation systems, algorithms
            and software
            We use the expression “immaterial objects” to refer to music-aesthetics dis-
            courses, notation systems, algorithms and software. They are immaterial because
            their existence cannot be reduced to physical characteristics. At the same time, in
            practice they are always realised as signs, for instances as texts, sketches (Notate),
            scores and programming, fixed on material supports such as paper, hard drives
            or USB sticks. Clearly, an algorithm does not exist only through its representa-
            tion on a computer screen, any more than a notation system is represented by
            ink molecules on paper (see Faulkner & Runde 2010; Lando et al. 2008). Texts,
            music notations and algorithms also need to be considered as symbols: as a
            verbal language, notation system or programming language, whose respective
            effectiveness is anchored in the relevant practices – reading, writing and inter-
            preting. Algorithms, scores and texts are designed to fulfilcertain defined tasks
            (e.g. calculating, representing, fixing, ordering, developing or portraying some-
            thing, instructing people, coordinating orchestra members). They are thus a
            kind of purposive tool. However, unlike material objects, they are not imme-
            diately to hand. It is for this reason that we also designate immaterial objects as
            cognitive tools (see Windsor & de Bézenac 2012).
              Our concept of cognitive tools follows the theory of Lev Vygotzky. James
            Wertsch (2007: 178) wrote of Vygotzky:

                In his view, a hallmark of human consciousness is that it is associated with
                the use of tools, especially “psychological tools” or “signs”. Instead of acting
                in a direct, unmediated way in the social and physical world, our contact with
                the world is indirect or mediated by signs […]. It is because humans inter-
                nalise forms of mediation provided by particular cultural, historical, and
                institutional forces that their mental functioning is sociohistorically situated.

            Vygotzky primarily focuses on verbal language. But many people also learn
            other kinds of languages during their lifetimes, for example mathematical,
            musical sign or programming languages. Vera John-Steiner (1995) developed
            the concept of “cognitive pluralism” to describe this phenomenon, a concept
            which can be applied to composers as well. Katharina Klement often works
            with graphic representations of sounds. For one composition, she drew
            coloured geometrical shapes on several transparencies (see Figure 1.3). She
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