Page 138 - Was Hitler a Riddle?
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The French Diplomats  125

            tern in the conduct of his foreign policy. in leaving the league of Nations,
            in announcing the expansion of the army on March 16, 1935, and now in
            sending his troops into the rhineland, Hitler was following a preconceived
            plan to expand German power. “[Hitler’s] ambition is not limited to rees-
            tablishing Germany’s sovereignty. the third reich has decided to go . . .
            further than William ii.” the Nazis’ next move, the ambassador predicted,
            would be the annexation of austria; Göring had bluntly stated that inten-
            tion in various pronouncements. Hitler would then make Czechoslovakia
            his next victim, having ultimately set his eyes on the establishment of “Ger-
            man hegemony in central europe. . . . if england gives way, if it surrenders,
            then Hitler will win. if it defends the principles of morality, then Hitler’s
            cause will fail.” the German people, the ambassador asserted, did not want
            to repeat the mistake of 1914, and if their country faced unyielding opposi-
            tion, in the end they would turn away from provocative policies. 67
              François-Poncet  believed  that  the  French  government  was  paralyzed,
            and he warned the leaders in Paris that they would regret their failure to re-
            spond to the “brutal action” of March 7 with an “act of the same character.”
            Unable to secure British support for a strong stand against Germany, afraid
            that the citizens of France would reject a response to Germany that might
            lead to military conflict, and still befuddled about Hitler’s ultimate goals,
            the government did not follow the ambassador’s advice. there was no seri-
            ous attempt to explain to the nation the likely consequences of advance into
            the rhineland. after two or three days of uncertainty, the statesmen of the
            Western powers “recovered their serenity” and decided to ignore Hitler’s
            move. the governments offered a variety of reasons for their inaction, and
            the result was predictable: the Führer could boast of another bloodless vic-
            tory on the international scene. 68
              Hitler’s self-confidence rose immeasurably. On March 18 he dissolved
            the reichstag and called for elections to enable the people to express their
            views on the latest developments. the electoral campaign proceeded as had
            all the others under Nazi rule, except that the public was more cowed than
            ever before. the Nazis scored their greatest electoral victory yet: out of for-
            ty-five million ballots, 98.8 percent backed the march into the rhineland.
              François-Poncet  fell  into  despair  and  once  again  raised  doubts  about
            Hitler’s sincerity in avowing his peaceful intentions. the ambassador was
            distressed  by  France’s  military  weakness,  which  prevented  the  country
            from standing up to the new Germany. He likened the relationship be-
            tween the two nations to a sexual relationship in which “Germany assumes
            to itself the role of the [dominant] male.” He ended the dispatch with a
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