Page 139 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

126 The French Diplomats

strong indictment of the Nazis that suggested his growing awareness of
a link between their conduct of affairs within Germany and their conduct
of foreign policy. “isn’t it too much to expect . . . us to believe,” François-
Poncet wrote, “in the sincerity of men who have burned their reichstag,
assassinated their own supporters when they have become a nuisance, and
violated without shame . . . international agreements that their country had
freely signed?” 69
a month later, on april 21, François-Poncet once again debated with
himself whether the Führer wanted peace or was preparing for war. He
concluded that the dictator was not eager to engage in military conflict,
especially since his moves had met with no resistance. He had achieved his
goals without bloodshed; why not continue with his successful strategy?
But then the ambassador raised a consideration to which he—unlike his
British colleagues rumbold and Phipps—had not always paid adequate at-
tention: Hitler’s character. He now referred to “his fits of brusque exalta-
tion and fanaticism, his rashness as a gambler that excites the determination
of his most reckless friends.” the Führer was aware that his past successes
had resulted from daring gambits on his part, and François-Poncet warned
that the West must expect the Nazis, whose ideology was fundamentally
bellicose, to behave as they invariably had since coming to power. 70
two weeks after he composed these thoughts, on May 6, the ambassa-
dor received news that confirmed his worst fears. ignoring promises they
had made only two months earlier, the Nazis had begun building fortifica-
tions in the rhine region. the work was scheduled to be completed by
wintertime, and then “Germany would be sufficiently prepared to wage
war.” François-Poncet was now convinced that Germany’s move into the
71
rhineland had undermined France’s credibility, especially among central
european nations, which France had promised to protect. He feared that
several of them, most notably austria and Czechoslovakia, would not be
able to withstand Nazi encroachments. 72
in the summer of 1936, Germany took another large step in enhanc-
ing its military. the government announced that the period of service for
military recruits would be increased from one year to two. François-Poncet
urged his government to pursue a two-pronged policy: rapid rearmament
coupled with a proposal to Germany for the negotiation of an agreement
to limit the arms race. if France and its allies did not rearm, the ambassador
advised, then “in one or two years Hitler will go to war.” 73
any lingering doubts that François-Poncet may have had about Hitler’s
grandiose designs on europe should have been swept away during an ex-