Page 144 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The French Diplomats 131

appeasers. But they had persuaded themselves that Germany might well be
restrained by the country’s economic vulnerability, which the editors dem-
onstrated with a careful analysis of the failure of the Nazis to achieve their
economic goal of autarky. in any case, “the German people to-day have no
more stomach for a great war against adversaries of their own caliber than
the French or the english or the americans. . . . the Germans do not want
to fight, and Herr Hitler certainly knows it. We believe that the Führer has
the will to peace.” 84
When his staff had completed its analysis of the articles, François-Poncet
added his own views. He thought the editors had made a serious attempt
to understand Nazi thinking and Nazi policies, but he rejected their con-
clusions as “a bit too optimistic.” true, Germany still faced many economic
difficulties, but he considered it a mistake to assume that the Nazi lead-
ers acted like leaders in the West when it came to military matters. Hitler
and his lieutenants had great faith in their huge army and air force, as well
as in Germany’s efficient industry, and they could count on a population
imbued with National socialist ideals and the traditions of obedience to
orders from above. in any case—and this was a critical point for the am-
bassador—the Nazi leaders were not guided by reason but by “sentiment.”
Hitler followed his emotions and led a movement whose driving forces
were excitement and exaltation. Finally, François-Poncet warned that Nazi
leaders were often inclined to underestimate their adversaries, whom they
tended to think of as “disunited, feeble, hesitant and cowardly.” 85

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François-Poncet’s last involvement in a major diplomatic negotiation in
Germany took place in september 1938 during the crisis over Hitler’s de-
mand that Czechoslovakia surrender its control over the sudetenland, a
region with a German-speaking majority. the Czechs rejected the demand
and were prepared to resist by force if Hitler ordered his troops to march
into the disputed area, but British prime minister Chamberlain was deter-
mined to avoid war, even if it required far-reaching concessions. during
the second half of september 1938, he traveled to Germany three times in
desperate attempts to ward off a military conflict. François-Poncet closely
followed the intense negotiations and perceptively commented on them.
after Chamberlain’s first visit, he noted that Hitler and his close collabora-
tors had interpreted the prime minister’s appearance in Germany as a sign
of weakness by Britain. the event inflated all the Nazi leaders with a sense
of triumph, pride, and self-confidence, coupled with contempt for their