Page 149 - Was Hitler a Riddle?
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136  The French Diplomats

                Montbas also raised a series of intriguing questions about the larger sig-
              nificance of Kristallnacht: Were the Nazi leaders abandoning all pretense
              of moderation, and were they prepared to strain relations with the United
              states and Great Britain, where the anti-Jewish violence evoked extensive
              criticism of the German government? did the new anti-Jewish campaign
              mean that the “spirit of accord” reached at Munich was no longer in ef-
              fect? Was a “stable” relationship between the West and the third reich
              impossible? Finally, did the attacks on Jews mean that Nazi Germany was
              committed to violence as a principle and that Hitler would not hesitate to
              subjugate any people he considered his country’s adversary? the last ques-
              tion is especially noteworthy because it touches on a very difficult and im-
              portant issue that is still debated by scholars and politicians: is there a direct
              link between a government’s domestic and foreign policies? Or, to relate
              this discussion directly to our topic, did the Nazis’ unhesitating resort to
              violence against the Jewish population at home mean that Germany would
              act just as ruthlessly toward foreign countries? in his last sentence Mont-
              bas observed that several diplomats from smaller countries believed that
              “if there were no changes in the domestic conditions of the third reich, a
              european conflict could well be inevitable.” 97
                to add to the diplomat’s anxiety, an analysis completed by the Berlin
              embassy on december 14, 1938, depicted in unprecedented detail the scope
              of Germany’s expansionist goals. On the basis of a careful reading of many
              journals and newspapers, the staff reached conclusions that must have jolt-
              ed officials in Paris. German ambitions in central europe were well known,
              but this report pointed out that Hitler had much more in mind. the Nazi
              leadership aspired to expand into the Near east and the Gulf of Persia,
              so that the reich would be able to exploit the economies of turkey and
              iran. the pre–World War i dream of a railroad from Berlin to Baghdad was
              to be realized, placing Germany in a powerful position to dominate the
              economies of a vast region.  the authors of the report were convinced that
                                     98
              Hitler’s grip on political power was now so overwhelming that he could
              lead the country into adventures that even some Nazi officials who still
              retained a sense of proportion might consider unrealistic. in addition, early
              in 1939, one of ambassador Coulondre’s “collaborators” had talked to a
              senior German official whose work put him in frequent contact with the
              Führer, and he had indicated that since the settlement of the conflict over
              the sudeten region “all the leaders of the reich are convinced that the Füh-
              rer is infallible.” the senior official also said that although Hitler genuinely
              wanted peace, Germany was bolstering its military forces so rapidly “that
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