Page 153 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

140 The French Diplomats

edly produced assessments of Nazism that revealed a sound understand-
ing of Hitler and of his most prominent subordinates. Beginning as early
as February 8, 1933, and ending shortly before his departure from Berlin
late in 1938, François-Poncet alone sent no fewer than ten dispatches to the
Foreign Office that contained detailed and insightful accounts of Hitler’s
extremism and psychological fragility. and the military experts attached to
the French embassy in Berlin sent additional reports to Paris that verified
Western suspicions of Germany’s extensive preparations for war.
Conceivably, François-Poncet would have been more effective in per-
suading his superiors in Paris to take a firm stand against Hitler’s aggres-
siveness had he been consistent in his evaluations of the Nazis, and certainly
historians would now treat him with more respect. On the other hand, if
French statesmen had read his dispatches with care, they would have been
aware of the dangers that lurked in Berlin. the French diplomats in Ger-
many differed with X not so much on the character of Nazism as on the
best way to deal with its aggressiveness. the differences with X concerned
strategy and tactics, and in politics a sound grasp of the ideology and moral
principles of an adversary does not count for much if it is not accompanied
by wise strategy and tactics.
François-Poncet’s and Coulondre’s frequent inconsistency on policy mat-
ters, despite their generally correct assessments of Hitler’s character and the
radicalism of Nazism, was no doubt deeply ingrained in their character. But
it was also a trait that fit well with the reluctance of their superiors in Paris
to act decisively in foreign affairs. the country’s political instability, a long-
standing feature of modern French history, was not congenial to strong, de-
cisive leadership. in the years from 1933 to 1940, fourteen governments ran
national affairs, and during that period the Foreign Office underwent eight
changes in leadership. as the historian Jean-Baptiste duroselle has pointed
out, the rapid turnover in top personnel did not encourage diligence on
the part of political leaders, although some of them were clearly able and
conscientious. even the most imaginative and dedicated foreign ministers
remained in office too short a time to develop and implement long-range
policies or some sort of “master plan.” to make matters worse, several min-
isters were “amazingly irresponsible.” For example, Joseph Paul-Boncour,
who held the post of foreign minister during the critical period from mid-
december 1932 until late January 1934, failed to read the dispatches from
French ambassadors in their entirety; he asked his subordinates to summa-
rize them in no more than three lines.
after an interlude of nine days following Paul-Boncour’s departure from