Page 151 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

138 The French Diplomats

astonishing details about a meeting the Führer had held on January 26
with thirty leading officers of the army, navy, and air force. the German
press had reported on the meeting in general terms, but a “well-informed
source” provided the French embassy with unsettling details. Hitler deliv-
ered a brief speech in which he insisted on “blind obedience to his orders.”
He let it be known that he did not want any officer to say to him, “i can-
not accept responsibility for this or that operation.” the Führer reminded
the assembled group that in september 1938, General ludwig Beck had
made such a comment to him, and by October he was no longer in service.
“i alone,” Hitler told the officers, “bear the responsibility [for Germany’s
policies and actions]. Whoever is not pleased with that can leave.” Hitler
thereupon walked from one officer to another and waited for each one to
take an oath of obedience to him. He then clasped the hand of the offi-
cer in his two hands. in this vein, a senior German officer told the French
military attaché in Berlin that henceforth opposition to Hitler’s plans by
senior officers could not be expected. in fact, the Führer became so confi-
dent of Germany’s unity and strength that he now embraced ribbentrop’s
position that Western powers would readily accede to Germany’s territorial
demands. 102
the approach of Coulondre to diplomacy during his service in Berlin
can be characterized as embracing a sound comprehension of the issues
tempered by excessive caution. this approach was especially pronounced
on March 13, 1939, in his reaction to Germany’s forcible annexation of Bo-
hemia and Moravia, the two regions of Czechoslovakia that had retained
their independence after the Munich agreement. Coulondre was shocked
by the Nazi aggression, but when the British ambassador Nevile Hen-
derson, himself a committed appeaser, proposed that Britain and France
register a protest—a very mild one—by recalling their emissaries from
Berlin, the Frenchman demurred. “i told . . . [Henderson] that it was up
to our government to decide on it, but that i personally do not favor it.”
Coulondre offered several reasons for his position: a break with Germany
would not induce Hitler to change his policy; once relations with Germany
had been severed, it would be very difficult to restore them; italy would
be the only country to benefit from such a break because it would be the
only state with influence on Hitler that retained a diplomatic delegation in
Berlin; finally, and most important, the withdrawal of French and British
diplomats would run the risk of strengthening the hand of Nazi extremists
who argued for “immediate war.” Coulondre believed that Hitler and a ma-
jority of the Nazi Party did not want to go to war just then, and that both