Page 148 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The French Diplomats 135

force,” according to which frontiers between nations were binding, and
they were binding not because they were established by treaties but because
they reflected the military realities in the balance of power between adjacent
countries. in view of this “Nazi doctrine,” the ambassador counseled that
although he favored collaboration between France and Germany for the
preservation of peace in europe, such cooperation could be fruitful only if
France was strong. a weak France would not be able to make its voice heard
in europe and would not be able to protect itself and its empire against
the “covetousness of the Germans.” Coulondre’s theory might have been
94
persuasive had the Nazis not demonstrated all too often that they were not
squeamish about spilling blood.
Not long after the meeting with Hitler, Coulondre met Göring and
Goebbels, both of whom were cordial and expressed the hope that relations
with France would be amicable. Coulondre was reluctant to draw “prema-
ture conclusions,” but he now believed that even the most “intransigent”
Nazi leaders wanted Germany to be on good terms with France. 95
the reporting on internal developments in Germany after François-Pon-
cet’s departure from Berlin was as comprehensive as it had been over the
preceding five years, and in some respects more perceptive. For example,
on November 15, 1938, Hugues Barthon de Montbas, the chargé d’affaires
at the embassy, analyzed the events of Kristallnacht with a sure eye for the
important details, terming that night “the ultimate offensive of National
socialism against the Jews.” the German public, he pointed out, was “not
deceived” by official statements that the action had been prompted by the
assassination in Paris of the diplomat rath by a German Jew. People knew
that the government was using the incident as a pretext for a renewed cam-
paign against Jews and the seizure of significant portions of their assets.
and the government had stepped up measures to isolate them from the rest
of the nation. some people believed that the assassination had been engi-
neered by Nazis, and many even believed that Goebbels, who had recently
lost favor in Hitler’s eyes because of a marital scandal, had planned the ac-
tion to burnish his reputation among ardent Nazis. 96
Montbas made the interesting point that, ever since the assassination of
rath, the Nazis had waged a new campaign against “international Jewry,”
which had tended to replace the long-standing campaign against “interna-
tional Bolshevism.” the Nazis justified the new emphasis by claiming that
“the Jewish enemy” planned to undermine the worldwide influence of Na-
tional socialism. it was a battle cry, the Nazi leaders believed, that would
arouse much sympathy among the German people.