Page 156 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The French Diplomats 143

ter how intense, was disarmament, unilateral if necessary. Blum deplored
Nazism, and he indicated that if Hitler attacked France he would favor
resistance. But his greatest concern was that a strong response by France to
German nationalism would reinvigorate French militarism and a “general
war atmosphere,” as well as reactionary sentiment. He had argued in 1934
and 1935 that if France embarked on disarmament, the “world conscience”
and “universal reprobation” would “force Hitler to comply.” He also be-
lieved that negotiations with Hitler and Mussolini could be productive,
an opinion he had voiced in december 1934 and repeated on several occa-
sions: “When the question of peace with Germany and italy is involved,
we are ready to shake all hands, even hands stained with blood.” as prime
minister, he told the senate that he believed Hitler when he proclaimed his
commitment to world peace. Blum justified his faith in the Führer by stat-
ing: “We do not intend to doubt the word of a former soldier who for four
years knew the misery of the trenches.” 109 thus, when Hitler sent his troops
into the rhineland on March 7, 1936, Blum and his party had been able to
come up with no better advice for the government than to act “with calm
and sang-froid.” still, by the time he became prime minister three months
later, the threat to France had grown so intense that he had no choice but
to initiate a program of stepped-up rearmament. 110 in much of europe, this
move did little to raise the stature of France, now widely regarded as having
lost its standing as a major power.
One unforeseen consequence of the advent to power of the Popular
Front was the growth of ultra-right-wing movements in France that hated
the left more than they feared Fascism or Nazism. during the first three
years of Nazi rule in Germany, a series of leagues sympathetic to the ex-
treme right had emerged in France, but only in 1936 did they become large
enough to pose a threat to the republic. the two most successful ones,
which were solidly reactionary if not fully Fascist—the Croix de feu led by
Colonel François de la rocque and action française led by Charles Maur-
ras—enlisted an estimated several hundred thousand supporters. their goal
was a political system based on “order, stability, authority and a return to
the old elites.” 111 the outright Fascists aimed for more radical change: their
slogans were “Better Hitler than stalin” and “Better Hitler than Blum.” 112
it was a general, Maurice Gamelin, a strong supporter of the republic,
who clearly understood the impact of social and political unrest—especially
in the first half of 1936—on France’s conduct of foreign policy. “it made
many of us lose sight of the dangers of Hitlerism and fascism at our door-
step because behind the ‘Popular Front’ one saw the specter of Bolshevism.