Page 162 - Was Hitler a Riddle?
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The American Diplomats  149

            and 95 seats in two years. it was a sign, Gordon asserted, of the “disgust
            and recklessness” pervasive in German society. People were now prepared
            to give their support to a “party whose leaders and promises are irrespon-
            sible.” two days later, Gordon wrote to his superiors in Washington that
            he had examined the party’s program and its campaign materials, and de-
            spite his best efforts, he could not find “any constructive element” in them:
            “when seeking to win votes from the Communists the National socialist
            orators declared that as their social theories were similar, they appealed to
            them to vote for a Communist form of government directed by Germans
            rather than the same thing under the guidance of Moscow; when invad-
            ing Nationalist territory, the party spokesman emphasized their adherence
            to the principle of private ownership of property.” a recurring theme of
            the Nazi campaign was that all “the country’s evils flowed from semitism,
            international banks, the Young Plan, the treaty of Versailles and all other
            international treaties with any provisions which might be considered ob-
            jectionable from a chauvinistic point of view.” Gordon was convinced that
            Hitler intended to establish “a reactionary dictatorship with, however, not
            even a suggestion as to the alternative measures contemplated for remedy-
            ing the conditions complained of.”
              elaborating on these statements, Gordon attributed the large vote for
            the Nazis to two factors: the “reckless frame of mind” of many Germans
            and the ignorance of the younger generation of the “horrors and hardships
            of war”; their only concern was the huge debt that had resulted from the
            war and that threatened to burden them for the rest of their lives. still, Gor-
            don did not think that the situation was hopeless; the republic, as he put
            it, had been dealt a “body-blow,” but not necessarily a “knock-out blow.”
            He argued—and most historians would now agree with him—that if “all
            sincere supporters of the republic” joined forces, if “strong leaders with a
            strong program could be evolved from the present welter,” many “reckless”
            supporters of the Nazi Party would return to the traditional parties, and the
            Weimar republic could still be saved. But he warned that if they failed “to
            sink their personal and doctrinal differences, then indeed a serious situation
            will present itself.”  Gordon returned to this theme a week later, when he
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            observed to the secretary of state that the most disturbing fact about the
            current political situation was that the “parliamentary parties lying between

              For more details on the election, see above, pp. 17–18.
              the Young Plan, adopted in 1930, reduced the annual reparation payments that Germany
            would be required to hand over to the allies for the cost of World War i. But the cost was still
            substantial and the payments would have to be made for fifty-nine years.
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