Page 166 - Was Hitler a Riddle?
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The American Diplomats 153
do their utmost to make Germany bündnisfähig (qualified to enter into al-
liances). Wiley added that he had been reliably informed that the “Nazis
are doing their best to flirt with the French.” they had let the French know
that they were prepared “to reach an agreement with France in respect of
both reparations and armaments.” in the last substantive paragraph of his
report, Wiley reversed course and cautioned that the outlook might not be
as bright as his meetings with the three Nazi leaders had suggested. “the
constant playing . . . [on] the political passions of the people [by the Na-
zis],” he cautioned, “is certainly not wholesome. the German mind, as the
war demonstrated, is particularly susceptible to nationalist appeal.” 15
several consular officials in different parts of Germany thought that the
political crisis would be resolved by “a return of the [Hohenzollern] mon-
archy within the next year.” to add to the confusion, the German ambas-
16
sador to Washington, Friedrich von Prittwitz und Gaffen, assured W. r.
Castle, the under secretary of state, that the present government “would
be likely to remain in power for a long time.” He based his prediction on
the assumption that Hitler was not “at all anxious to take over all the au-
thority.” even if his party made “large gains in the next election,” he might
well attempt to form a government with the Nationalists, but the German
ambassador never made clear why this would be Hitler’s preference. am-
17
bassador sackett made much the same argument in a dispatch of June 4,
1932, that he composed after a long conversation with Bernhard Wilhelm
von Bülow, the state secretary in the Foreign Ministry, who contended that
Hitler did not want a purely Nazi government because he “recognized that
in his party there is no proper Cabinet material available.” the truth is that
18
at this time no one could read the mind of Hitler on questions of short-
range tactics; a wily politician, he knew how to conceal his intentions.
shortly after the reichstag election of July 31, 1932, from which the Nazis
emerged as the largest party with 37.2 percent of the vote and 230 seats in
the reichstag, the reports from Berlin became more pessimistic, or perhaps
one should say more realistic. On august 15, 1932, sackett told the secretary
of state that “Germany has for a long time past been in a situation which
could well be termed a state of latent civil war.” a week later, sackett in-
19
formed Washington that ever since the election the Nazis had “perpetrated
acts of atrocious violence at various places throughout the reich from east
Prussia to Bavaria.” a total of nineteen instances of terrorism “resulting in
deaths and serious damage to property” had been reported by the police.
the worst violence took place in Königsberg, where Nazis, disappointed
by their failure to win a local election for the reichstag seat, “stoned shop-