Page 164 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The American Diplomats 151

it was unthinkable that Germany could attempt to cope with the combined
armed forces of France, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and that at any rate, as
far as his party was concerned, it entirely realized the complete impossibility
at the present time of attaining its objects by force.” 11
Of course, the key words in this statement were “at the present time,”
and this nuance was not lost on Gordon. Nevertheless, the american diplo-
mat was impressed by schickedanz’s demeanor: he did not give the impres-
sion of being a “hot-headed ‘wild man’ as the Nazis are often depicted in
the local press.” He was quite young, about thirty-five, well mannered, and
although clearly a true believer, he “expressed himself throughout in mod-
erate and restrained terms.” schickedanz, Gordon acknowledged, made as
strong a case as he could for his party, “but it obviously cannot stand up
under the slightest analysis.” He never explained how the party planned
to achieve its goals, and Gordon concluded that “on his own showing, its
policy is one of sheer opportunism.” the plain purpose of the interview, as
Gordon saw it, was to impress upon the world that the Nazis did not in-
tend to take power “by violent and illegal measures.” the chargé d’affaires
12
was not won over, as his later dispatches would demonstrate.
about a year after this meeting, the embassy was asked to respond to a
memorandum on the political situation in Germany prepared by officials
at the state department, who had based their analysis primarily on news-
paper reports. interestingly, at this time the analysts in Washington were
considerably more pessimistic than their colleagues in Berlin. “Hitler’s po-
sition,” the memorandum contended, “both on the basis of votes cast and
psychologically, is unquestionably obtaining increased strength and there is
a general expectation that his group will attain power soon, either as a part
of the present Government or in charge of the Government.” the memo-
randum also suggested that both in its economic program and in its stress
on nationalistic slogans, Nazism resembled Mussolini’s Fascism. 13
the embassy quickly responded with its own analysis, which depicted a
much less dire situation in Germany. the diplomats in Berlin acknowledged
that the Nazis had greatly increased their electoral support in september
1930, but they insisted that the assumption that Hitler’s party would con-
tinue to grow “in geometric progression” was “undoubtedly erroneous.”
the party might secure the support of 35 percent of the electorate, but it
would not come any closer than that to 50 percent and therefore would
not be able to form a government by itself, although it might form one by
establishing a coalition with the Catholic parties (the Center Party and the
Bavarian Catholic Party). the embassy also rejected the notion that Na-