Page 206 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The American Diplomats 193

only the elimination of Jews from economic life but driving them from
German dwellings and putting them in a section by themselves.” Jews, the
article predicted, would grow poorer and would then “constitute a breed-
ing ground for Bolshevism and crime.” at that point, Germany would be
faced with the necessity of “exterminating the Jewish underworld in the
same way we in our orderly state are wont to exterminate criminals, i.e.,
with fire and sword. the result would be the actual and definite end of
Jewry in Germany and its complete extermination.” the only alternative
to this outcome would be for the democracies, especially the United states
and Britain, to admit large numbers of Jews into their countries. elsewhere
in the dispatch, Gilbert quoted an editorial of November 23 in the Völkischer
Beobachter to the effect that the “German people have now embarked upon
the ‘final and unalterably uncompromising solution’ of the problem of the
Jews in Germany.” 120
the events during the night of November 9–10 were so horrendous
that Messersmith pleaded for more than disapproval by the United states.
“When a country which vaunts its civilization as superior,” he wrote to Hull
on November 14, “commits in cold blood and with deliberation acts worse
than those we have in the past dealt with vigorously, the time has come, i
believe, when it is necessary to take action beyond mere condemnation.” it
was a “mad act” by the German leaders, made all the more reprehensible
by their threat to take “further action” if foreign countries “should even
pass censure.” Messersmith urged Hull to recommend to the president that
ambassador Wilson be ordered to return to Washington immediately “for
consultation.” Messersmith acknowledged that such a step would not stop
Nazi persecution of the Jews, but at least it would encourage “right-think-
ing people” in Germany and would give the authorities there “food for
thought.” Moreover, in France and england, as well as throughout europe,
such a step would certainly be welcome. 121
On the very day that Hull received this memorandum, he discussed it
with President roosevelt and other members of the administration. some
officials thought that Wilson should remain in Germany at this critical time
to keep an eye on events, while others feared that his removal from Ber-
lin would be seen as a defeat for the “realists,” who still favored negotia-
tions with the Nazi regime. roosevelt agreed with Messersmith, who also
received support from Hull. On November 15, the president announced
that Wilson had been summoned to Washington for “consultations” and is-
sued a statement condemning the violence in Germany, which had “deeply
shocked public opinion in the United states.” 122 americans, the president