Page 210 - Was Hitler a Riddle?
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The American Diplomats 197
did roosevelt decide that negotiations between the West and the Führer
were pointless. 134 the president was now convinced that Hitler’s policies
threatened to unleash a military conflict and that measures should be taken
to resist him. But he could not come up with any specific steps that Western
powers should undertake. 135
the authorities in Washington received pleas from citizens all over the
country, often from people respected in the professions or in their com-
munity, to avoid any measures that could result in america’s being drawn
into war. the two following letters may be taken as samples of the thou-
sands that reached the capital. On November 18, 1938, when many people
in the political class in europe had concluded that war was inevitable, J.
anton de Haas, the William Ziegler Professor of international relations
at Harvard and the author of five well-regarded books, sent President roo-
sevelt a plea for “positive, constructive action” to prevent military conflict.
de Haas complimented roosevelt for having condemned Germany for its
recent “barbarism” in attacking the Jews, but he warned that this “nega-
tive action” would not be effective. the professor asserted that the German
people were not united in supporting Hitler. in fact, the “outrages” against
the Jews and Catholics had disaffected many of them, and they yearned for
a viable alternative to Nazism. the United states, the professor claimed,
could help bring about regime change. “We can offer a trade treaty and
financial aid in the rebuilding of Germany on condition that the nation
returns to the republican form of government, guarantees fair treatment of
minority groups, and is prepared to join in a world conference for limita-
tion of arms.” even at this “crucial time,” de Haas contended, such an offer
could “strengthen the cause of decent Germans sufficiently to bring about
a collapse of Hitlerism.” the letter can only be described as a fanciful
136
dream, but the desperate desire to avoid war generated many such dreams.
another letter, this one sent to Under secretary of state sumner Welles
in early January 1939 by Wallace H. strowd from Nashville, tennessee,
was less visionary but probably more representative of american thinking
on foreign policy. strowd’s missive amounted to a passionate plea against
american intervention in the “domestic affairs of a friendly power” on be-
half of persecuted Jews. strowd warned that such intervention “may lead
to war, and if it does, would lead to the killing of more american boys
and probably women and children than there are Jews in Germany, and
at a cost exceeding the entire holdings of German Jews.” He declared his
sympathy for the plight of the Jews, but he insisted that the United states
could not possibly settle “the affairs of the world.” He knew many people,