Page 210 - Was Hitler a Riddle?
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The American Diplomats  197

            did roosevelt decide that negotiations between the West and the Führer
            were pointless. 134  the president was now convinced that Hitler’s policies
            threatened to unleash a military conflict and that measures should be taken
            to resist him. But he could not come up with any specific steps that Western
            powers should undertake. 135
              the authorities in Washington received pleas from citizens all over the
            country, often from people respected in the professions or in their com-
            munity, to avoid any measures that could result in america’s being drawn
            into war. the two following letters may be taken as samples of the thou-
            sands that reached the capital. On November 18, 1938, when many people
            in the political class in europe had concluded that war was inevitable, J.
            anton de Haas, the William Ziegler Professor of international relations
            at Harvard and the author of five well-regarded books, sent President roo-
            sevelt a plea for “positive, constructive action” to prevent military conflict.
            de Haas complimented roosevelt for having condemned Germany for its
            recent “barbarism” in attacking the Jews, but he warned that this “nega-
            tive action” would not be effective. the professor asserted that the German
            people were not united in supporting Hitler. in fact, the “outrages” against
            the Jews and Catholics had disaffected many of them, and they yearned for
            a viable alternative to Nazism. the United states, the professor claimed,
            could help bring about regime change. “We can offer a trade treaty and
            financial aid in the rebuilding of Germany on condition that the nation
            returns to the republican form of government, guarantees fair treatment of
            minority groups, and is prepared to join in a world conference for limita-
            tion of arms.” even at this “crucial time,” de Haas contended, such an offer
            could “strengthen the cause of decent Germans sufficiently to bring about
            a collapse of Hitlerism.”  the letter can only be described as a fanciful
                                 136
            dream, but the desperate desire to avoid war generated many such dreams.
              another letter, this one sent to Under secretary of state sumner Welles
            in  early  January  1939  by Wallace  H.  strowd  from  Nashville, tennessee,
            was less visionary but probably more representative of american thinking
            on foreign policy. strowd’s missive amounted to a passionate plea against
            american intervention in the “domestic affairs of a friendly power” on be-
            half of persecuted Jews. strowd warned that such intervention “may lead
            to war, and if it does, would lead to the killing of more american boys
            and probably women and children than there are Jews in Germany, and
            at a cost exceeding the entire holdings of German Jews.” He declared his
            sympathy for the plight of the Jews, but he insisted that the United states
            could not possibly settle “the affairs of the world.” He knew many people,
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