Page 62 - The Economist Asia January 2018

46 Europe
Charlemagne Torn over Tehran The Economist January 27th 2018

Splits overthe Iran nucleardeal are testing the transatlanticbond
hive off nuclear proliferation from broader concerns. But that ar-
gument seems to be losingground in Washington.
Britain and, especially, France still hope to keep Mr Trump on
board (Germany, without a propergovernment since September,
is otherwise engaged). Diplomats say they have long leaned on
Iran to curb itsballistic-missile programme. In March France’sfor-
eign ministerwill visitTehran to tryto talkthe mullahs round; Mr
Macron himself has been invited to Iran. Mr Trump has also be-
stowed hisfirststate-visitinvitation upon hisFrench counterpart.
Mr Macron may visit just weeks before Mr Trump is due to make
his final decision on the Iran sanctions, on May12th.
Mr Trump has left the Europeans in an tight spot, obliged to
side with Russia, China and Iran against their old ally. His threats
to kill the Iran deal have already left it in a “zombie state”, accord-
ing to a new report published by Bourse & Bazaar, a website that
promotes trade with Iran. The side-deals Mr Tillerson is pushing
for undermine the Europeans’ strategy of predictability—and
there is no guarantee that they will satisfy Mr Trump (or the Iran
hawks in Congress). Beyond Iran, tensions simmer between the
EU’s instinct for engagement and an American approach that
veers between aggression and unpredictability. This makes for
ITY the poor European who seeks consistency. On January some awkward conversations in a club that is not yet ready to
P22nd Mike Pence, America’s vice-president, said that the Un- considerlife withoutAmerican protection. “Trump highlightsthe
ited States was on the verge of quitting the nuclear agreement strategic dilemma of the Europeans in a way that is very uncom-
signed with Iran in 2015. Atthe same time RexTillerson, the secre- fortable for them,” says Jan Techau, an analyst at the German
tary of state, was in London expressing optimism that the deal Marshall Fund in Berlin.
could be saved with a bit of tinkering. Foreign ministers from How should they proceed? Mr Trump’s administration is
across the European Union were in Brussels that day; the confu- clearly split on Iran. European efforts to rescue the deal would
sion hovered above their conversation like an Amazon drone strengthen the hand of the square-jawed generals around Mr
bearingeitherchocolates ordynamite. Trump who do not wish to antagonise America’s allies or em-
Mr Trump’s carnivalesque approach to the presidency has bolden Iran’shardliners. YetMrTrump hasresisted pressure from
made life hard for America’s allies, but his first year in office has hisadvisersbefore, aswith hisdecision to withdrawfrom the Par-
not brought forth anythinglike the full horrors that some predict- is climate deal. He may well do so again.
ed. Congress has boxed him in on Russia, NATO does not yet tot- Many argue that the Europeans therefore need contingency
ter and trade wars have failed to break out (although this week plans. America’s biggest weapon is not reimposing its own sanc-
brought worrying news). Even if many Europeans reject Mr tions on Iran, but slapping punitive measures on European firms
Trump as baffling and odious—just 25% in a recent Gallup survey and banks that do business there. Ellie Geranmayeh of the Euro-
express approval of his presidency—the transatlantic bond re- pean Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, suggests thatthe
mains intact. Europeans should work hard with Congress to seek exemptions
Butthe threatto the Iran deal of2015, nowhangingbya thread, from such “secondary sanctions”; if that fails, she says they
could change all that. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action should threaten countervailing sanctions on American invest-
(JCPOA), to give it its full title, is the EU’s signature foreign-policy ments in Europe. Others might well argue that a tit-for-tat trade
achievement (some might say there are few rivals). Three EU warwill do no one any good.
members—Britain, France and Germany—are co-signatories,
along with America, Russia and China. The EU has a formal role Europe help thyself
in overseeing its implementation. The deal eased a security The American security guarantee remains indispensable; the
threat in the Middle East, reduced the likelihood of war between primary taskfor policymakers on both sides ofthe Atlantic must
America and Iran, and represented a triumph for the EU’s pre- alwaysbe to lessen divisions, notto accelerate a divorce. The best
ferred diplomatic method: dogged, law-bound and multilateral. way to do that would be for Europe to spend more on its own de-
The EU saw it as a springboard for commercial and cultural en- fence, undercutting those in Washington, Mr Trump included,
gagement with Iran and, though this was never a formal part of who see the EU as a free-rider. But Europe can practise some pru-
the agreement, a way to bringit in from the geopolitical cold. dent insurance, too, working to develop its own nascent security
Yet on January 12th Mr Trump threatened to reimpose sanc- co-operation, so long as that does not divert resources away from
tionson Iran within 120 days, thusnullifyingAmerica’sparticipa- NATO. Mr Trump is especially erratic, but Europeans cannot sim-
tion in the deal, if Europe failed to fix its “terrible flaws”. Ameri- ply assume that his successor will restore business as usual. It is
can worries with the deal seem to cluster around three issues: only sensible for them to gird themselves for a world in which
“sunset” clauses after which Iran can ramp up enrichment; Iran’s their interests may align a bit less often with America’s, whoever
ballistic-missile programme; and itsmischief-makingin Syria, Ye- is in charge. Mr Trump, after all, won the presidency while hold-
men, Lebanon and elsewhere. The Europeans, unusually united ing its foreign-policy establishment in disdain. That lesson will
in their defence of the deal, say that its purpose was precisely to not be lost in America; and norshould it be in Europe. 7