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law, likely within months, a special court officer called a ùcourt marshalû will

be authorized to make a warrantless arrest of those who violate EM bail or
abscond.

Experience in other countries demonstrates that EM allows criminal

justice agencies to manage offenders with high risk, and it is against the

principle of proportionality to use GPS tracking with a low risk offender,
especially those who are still presumed to be innocent (Nellis 2015: 18-19).

The implementation of Thailandsûs EM bail seems to be incompatible with this

principle. The limited amount of data assembled so far for the first evaluation

report makes it risky to assess whether EM bail in Thailand, either as a stand-

alone measure or combined with money bail, is or is not actually an example
of net-widening (ibid:20-21). Nevertheless, to give the Thai EM bail project its

due, one must assess the program against its stated goal, reducing inequality

in the money bail system. As elaborated in the forgoing sections, the
concept is promising, and can even be said to have the appearance of success,

but the evaluation report could not convincingly prove such accomplishment.

Judging from the Thai experience in 2018, which was by and large

a very successful one, more use of EM as a bail condition is planned for 2019.

Now that more judges in Thailand have become acquainted with EM

technology, the Office of the Judiciary can turn its focus on improving the
quality of the EM experience for accused and court officers alikefibetter

equipment, better training, better procedures and guidelines for who is placed

on EM, and better data analysis in order to make the essential determination
about who is to pay, the çuseré or the public. In its present form, EM bail

has not yet changed the decision-making of judges; they continue framing

their ùin/out decisionsû in terms of bail money first, with EM bail a way to

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