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              provide certain arrestees (usually poorer ones) with ùa discountû when they

              consents to wear an ankle bracelet.  This approach still allows the rich
              accused to benefit from the system, as they are essentially free of financial

              constraints in choosing whether to post money bail and avoid having their

              liberty restricted by an electronic monitor.


                      To be fair, the Thai judiciary did a great job in raising awareness of
              EM among judges in a very short period of time.  Moreover, the direct benefits

              of the project to thousands of poor defendants and their families are plain to

              see.  They got a chance to stay out of jail without having to pay a hefty fee,

              but still having to pay a price of a different currencyfirestriction on their

              liberty and privacy.  Finally, although it is debatable whether the bold decision
              to abruptly expand the pilot into a project for the whole country was a good

              or bad one, it seems clear that the Office made a mistake in decoupling the

              risk assessment project from the EM bail project.  Evaluating risk needs to
              be at the heart of bail decision-making, even as every effort must be made

              to ensure that the system is fair to all, rich and poor alike.  Integrating

              effective risk assessment into bail decisions may well broaden the pool of

              detainees for whom EM bail can be safely used.  Only when EM is an option

              for a significant share of defendants can it serve as a meaningful alternative
              to cash bail.  Until then, a bail system that treats all arrestees equally while

              ensuring that dangerous offenders are not released without proper supervision

              remains an elusive goal for Thailand, as it does for so many jurisdictions.
















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