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324                               Bert Olivier

                          This line of thinking, which has far-reaching implications for current thinking about the
                       differences – or the presumed similarities – between humans and artificial intelligence, has
                       been resurrected, perhaps surprisingly, by one of the most brilliant computer-scientists in the
                       world, namely David Gelernter of Yale University in the United States. In his recent book,
                       The Tides of Mind: Uncovering the Spectrum of Consciousness (2016) Gelernter deviates
                       from  what  one  might  expect  from  a  computer  scientist,  namely,  to  wax  lyrical  about  the
                       (putatively)  impending  ‘Singularity’,  when  (according  to  Kurzweil)  AI  will  immeasurably
                       surpass human intelligence. Gelernter dissents from conventional wisdom in the world of AI-
                       research by drawing on the work of the father of ‘depth-psychology’, Sigmund Freud, as well
                       as iconic literary figures such as Shakespeare and Proust, to demonstrate that the mind covers
                       a  “spectrum”  of  activities,  instead  of  being  confined,  as  most  computer  scientists  and
                       philosophers of mind appear to believe, to just the high-focus, logical functions of so-called
                       ‘rational’ thinking. Gelernter conceives of the mind across this “spectrum”, from “high focus”
                       mental  activities  like  strongly  self-aware  reflection,  through  “medium”  ones  such  as
                       experience-oriented thinking (including emotion-accompanied daydreaming) to “low focus”
                       functions like “drifting” thought, with emotions flourishing, and dreaming (2016: 3; see pp.
                       241-246 for a more detailed summary of these mental levels). At the “high focus” level of the
                       mental spectrum, memory is used in a disciplined manner, according to Gelernter, while at
                       the  medium-focus  niveau  it  “ranges  freely”  and  when  one  reaches  the  low-focus  level
                       memory “takes off on its own”. The point of delineating this “spectrum” is, as I see it, to
                       demonstrate as clearly and graphically as possible that the human “mind” is characterised by
                       different “tides”, all of which belong to it irreducibly, and not only the one that Gelernter
                       locates at the level of “high focus” (and which conventional AI-research has claimed as its
                       exclusive province). This enables him to elaborate on the nature of creativity that, according
                       to him, marks an irreducible difference between human (creative) intelligence and thinking,
                       on  the  one  hand,  and  AI,  on  the  other.  By  contrast,  ‘mainstream’  artificial  intelligence
                       research (or the ‘mind sciences’ in general) concentrates on precisely the high-focus level of
                       mental functions, in the (erroneous) belief that this alone is what ‘mind’ is, and moreover, that
                       it represents what the human mind has in common with artificial intelligence (Gelernter 2016:
                       xi-xix).
                          In  short,  unlike  the  majority  of  his  professional  colleagues,  Gelernter  insists  on  the
                       difference  between  “brain”  and  “mind”,  on  the  distinctive  character  of  free  association  as
                       opposed  to  focused,  conscious  mental  activity,  and  on  the  contribution  of  fantasy  and
                       dreaming to creative thinking. At a time when there is an increasing tendency, ironically, to
                       use something created by human beings, namely the computer, as a reductive model to grasp
                       what it is to be human, Gelernter disagrees emphatically: there is a fundamental difference
                       between  the  computer  as  an  instance  of  artificial  intelligence  and  being  human,  or  more
                       exactly, the human mind in all its variegated roles. In this way he confirms Jonze’s fictionally
                       projected  insight  in  Her  about  the  divergent  character  of  AI,  albeit  in  a  different  register,
                       which precludes playing with the possibility, as Jonze’s film does, that an OS such as the
                       fictional  Samantha  could  perhaps  discover,  and  explore,  a  field  of  artificial  intelligence
                       ‘activities’ that human beings could only guess at.
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