Page 159 - Leadership in the Indian Army

the right, and 3 Para MLI on the left. At 1300 hrs, when 3 Para MLI
reached Point 3399, word came through that 19 Infantry Brigade had
already entered Jhangar. Operation VIJAY was over.

After the loss of Jhangar in December 1947, Usman had taken a vow, like
Rana Pratap, that he would not sleep on a bed, until he had avenged its loss.
True to his vow, he had spent the last three months on the floor, even
though it was bitterly cold. Now that he had redeemed his pledge, he asked
for a cot to be brought in. Since none was available in the brigade HQ, one
was borrowed from the village and that night, Usman slept on a bed.
After the capture of Jhangar, 50 Para Brigade stayed on to defend the

town, while 19 Infantry Brigade was withdrawn to Naushera. The next three
months were spent in consolidating the defences and beating back enemy
attacks, which continued to be launched. There were two major ones against
Jhangar, on 16 April and 10 May 1948. Both were beaten back, with heavy
casualties to the enemy. After this, Usman decided to clear the enemy from
the area of Sabzkot, an advance base that was being used to protect the line

of communication from Mirpur. The enemy strength was estimated to be
about two companies. One of its forward positions, called MG Hill, was just
1,800 metres from the Indian positions. Usman gave the task of clearing
MG Hill, which was expected to be held by a company, to 3 Para MLI,
while 2 Rajputana Rifles, which had been loaned to 50 Para Brigade from
19 Infantry Brigade, was asked to put in a flanking attack behind the feature
along Keri, and take Point 3150. Thereafter, 3 Para MLI was to capture

Point 3900, with the other battalion mopping up the area. After completing
this task, both battalions were to encircle SabzKot and destroy it. It was a
well-conceived plan; unfortunately, it was based on imprecise intelligence.
The attack on MG Hill by 3 Para MLI was launched at first light on 21
May 1948, and progressed well till the assaulting troops were about 150
metres from the enemy’s forward defences. Then the enemy opened up with

automatics and men began to fall. Some managed to reach the top of the
hill, but were pushed back by enemy counter-attacks. It soon became clear
that the enemy strength was almost a battalion, and not a company, as
Usman had estimated based on the intelligence available to him when he
planned the operation. In a clever move, the enemy had kept the major
portion of their force on the reverse slopes, siting only a few bunkers on the
forward slope. Usman ordered the battalion to break contact and withdraw

with the support of tanks and artillery. This was achieved shortly after