Page 161 - Leadership in the Indian Army

their weight. He believed that loyalty was a two-way street, and always
stood up for his subordinates.
One day, a very strongly-worded signal was received from HQ JAK

Force. It demanded an explanation from the BIO for sending in clear a six-
figure map reference of one of our pickets that had been shelled by the
enemy. This had been included in the Situation Report (SITREP), which is
sent every day to higher HQ. Since the BIO was responsible for this error,
the Divisional HQ wanted his head served to them on a platter. A very
scared Sinha took the signal to Usman, expecting to receive a blasting
which he admittedly deserved. Usman looked at the signal and, without

raising an eyebrow, asked for a message pad. He drafted a reply: ‘A six-
figure map reference of our own position in question may have been news
to the JAK Force HQ, but I assure you it was no news to the enemy.’ This
was the last that was heard of it.
Usman lost his life on 3 July 1948; the circumstances surrounding his
tragic death have been described by S.C. Sinha, who was present. Every

evening at 5.30 p.m., Usman held a meeting in the sand model room, which
was nothing more than a couple of tents rigged together. That day, the time
of the meeting had been advanced by half an hour and it finished earlier
than usual. At 5.45 p.m., the enemy started shelling the Brigade HQ. But for
the change in timing Usman and his staff would have been inside the tents
when four 25-pounder shells landed about 500 metres north of the
crossroads. These were ranging shots, since the next salvo fell nearer.

Everyone scrambled for cover, with the medical officer diving under his
charpai (string-bed used in Indian villages) and the cooks clinging to the
tent walls in the mistaken belief that this would give them adequate
protection.
Usman and a few of his staff officers had been walking around the HQ
after the meeting ended. When the shelling began, they found shelter under

a large overhanging rock in a terraced field, just above the signallers’
bunker. With Usman were his artillery battery commander, Major Bhagwan
Singh, and the BIO, Captain S.C. Sinha. In an effort to silence the enemy
guns, our own field battery began to return fire. Realising the futility of
firing at the enemy guns, which were well entrenched, Usman ordered
Bhagwan Singh to turn his guns to the west and engage Point 3150.
Bhagwan was surprised, since the enemy was firing from the south. But

when Usman insisted, Bhagwan realised that Point 3150 was the obvious