Page 157 - Leadership in the Indian Army

operation. It was nightfall by the time 3 Para MLI, which was in the van of
the advance of 50 Para Brigade, reached Kothi Dhar and bivouacked there
for the night.

Ahead of Kothi Dhar lay the formidable obstacle of Phir Thal Naka,
where the enemy had his main line of defences. From Kothi Dhar, the route
followed by the Indian troops had to pass through a deep saddle before
going on to Phir Thal Naka, which had a sharp cliff on its north-eastern
face, but a more gradual slope towards the south-west. The peak in the
north-east dominated the rest of the ridge, while the entire ridge overlooked
the saddle in the south-east, through which the advance of 50 Para Brigade

had to pass. The saddle which ran north to south was narrow at the northern
end, where it was blocked by a col joining Kothi Dhar to Phir Thal Naka.
Towards the south, it widened to about 2,500 metres, which is where the
advancing troops were planning to cross. About a third of the way across
was a hillock, with a village named Kea on its northern edge. It was
surrounded by open, terraced fields, strewn with boulders.

Soon after reaching Kothi Dhar, the battalion commander despatched
patrols to Chahi village and towards Phir Thal Naka. The patrol to the
village did see an enemy patrol of platoon strength on the move, but the
patrol that had gone towards Phir Thal Naka only saw what they thought
was a group of peasants carrying baskets on their heads. The following
morning, 3 Para MLI commenced their advance at 0830 hrs, and had started
climbing the hillock at Kea by 1000 hrs. As soon as the leading company

had gone over the top and were beginning to go down the slope on the
opposite side, the enemy suddenly opened fire with automatic weapons
from Phir Thal Naka. Among the first casualties was the company
commander, Major S.P. Chopra, who was shot through the head even as he
was trying to pass on a message to the battalion HQ. The stalled advance
and breakdown in wireless communications added to the general confusion.

Lieutenant Colonel Virk sent Captain (later Major General) S.C. Sinha, the
battalion signal officer, to find out what had happened. Within a few hours,
3 Para MLI had suffered 18 casualties, including two officers who were
killed. Three lives were lost trying to recover the body of Major Chopra
under heavy enemy fire, but the task was accomplished.
Usman wanted to pull back 3 Para MLI and make another attempt after
some additional preparation, including getting artillery support, which they

did not have. But Virk insisted that he would be able to hold on and Usman