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The enemy was building up for an attack on Naushera, and it was vital to
                wrest Kot from them before this happened. Usman assured Cariappa that he
                would capture the feature within the next few days.

                   Kot  lay  about  9  kilometres  north-east  of  Naushera  and  overlooked  the
                Naushera  Tawi  valley  to  the  north,  south  and  south-west  for  about  10
                kilometres. It served as a transit camp for the enemy, since it lay on their
                route  from  Rajauri  to  Siot.  The  strength  of  the  enemy  battalion  was
                estimated to be about 500 men, most of whom were deserters from the State
                Forces and ex-servicemen of the Indian Army. They were reported to have
                two  or  three  3-inch  mortars  and  one  or  two  medium  machine-guns,  in

                addition to four light machine-guns and about 400 rifles. The defences at
                Kot had mutual support with the enemy position at Pathradi.
                   The operation for the capture of Kot was code-named KIPPER, the name
                by which Cariappa was affectionately known in the army. Usman planned
                the  operation  meticulously.  He  decided  to  attack  both  features
                simultaneously, with one battalion for each feature. While 3 Para MLI was

                to  advance  on  the  right  and  capture  Pathradi  and  Uparla  Dandesar,  2/2
                Punjab, which had been given to him for the operation, was to attack from
                the left and capture Kot. The attack was to be supported by a squadron of 7
                Cavalry,  a  company  less  a  platoon  of  Mahar  machine-gunners,  and  two
                batteries of field artillery. The IAF was asked to provide some air support, if
                required, from their base at Jammu. A deception plan was also made to give
                the enemy  the  impression  that  an  advance  to  Jhangar  was  in  the  offing.

                Mules  and  ponies  were  hired,  and  it  was  given  out  that  they  would  be
                required to go to Jhangar.
                   To ensure the element of surprise, Usman had decided on a silent attack.
                Having moved off at last light on 31 January, the troops of 3 Para MLI were
                almost on the objective before first light next morning when a dog in the
                village  of  Pathradi  began  to  bark  and  alerted  the  enemy,  who  opened  up

                with everything he had. The assaulting troops rushed forward to charge the
                enemy,  with  the  famous  war  cry  of  the  Marathas— Bol  Shri  Chatrapati
                Shivaji Maharaj ki Jai. There was hand-to-hand fighting, and the bayonet
                was  used  with  effect.  The  enemy  withdrew,  leaving  several  dead  and
                wounded. After consolidating the defences at Pathradi, a company was sent
                to Uparla Dandesar, which was captured by midday.
                   The attack on Kot was launched at 0630 hrs on 1 February 1948. By 0700

                hrs, it appeared that the feature had been captured, and 2/2 Punjab sent a
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