Page 153 - Leadership in the Indian Army

success signal at 0710 hrs. However, it was later learnt that the battalion had
gone through the village without searching it thoroughly and had missed
some of the enemy who were sleeping. They later soon launched a fierce

counter-attack, and by 0715 hrs had recaptured the feature. Usman was
prepared for this contingency, having kept back two companies in reserve.
These were now ordered to move up, and after heavy artillery and air
bombardment, the feature was recaptured at 1010 hrs. The enemy losses
numbered 156 dead and 200 wounded; 2/2 Punjab suffered 11 casualties—
seven dead and four wounded. In the attack on Pathradi and Uparla
Dandesar, 3 Para MLI had 13 casualties—three dead and 10 wounded—

after killing 50 of the enemy. This was the first major reverse inflicted on
the enemy in prepared defences, and a costly one at that. Since it cut off the
supply route to Naushera, its loss was a critical factor during the battle
which took place six days later.
On 6 February 1948, one of the most important battles of the Jammu and
Kashmir operations was fought at Naushera. Intoxicated by his success at

Jhangar, the enemy tried to capture Naushera several times, but failed, due
mainly to the strength of the garrison and the clever positioning of troops by
Usman. The loss of Kot and Pathradi was a big blow for the enemy and,
infuriated by the defeat, he put everything he had into the battle at
Naushera. At that time, there were five battalions under Usman: 3 Para
Rajput, 3 Para MLI, 1 Rajput, 2/2 Punjab and 1 Patiala. In addition, he had
a squadron of 7 Cavalry, and a battery each of field and mountain guns. The

strength at his disposal was thus considerably more than what he had at
Jhangar.
Usman had planned to attack Kalal at 0600 hrs. However, from
intelligence reports he learned that the enemy was also planning to attack
Naushera on the same day. Usman immediately alerted all the pickets, and
his timely warning played a crucial role in preventing a major catastrophe.

On 6 February at 0640 hrs the enemy launched a determined attack, in
which about 11,000 troops were used. After a mortar bombardment lasting
20 minutes, about 3,000 Pathans attacked Tain Dhar and an equal number
hurled themselves at Kot. In addition, about 5,000 tribesmen were used to
attack surrounding pickets, including Kangota and Redian.
The Tain Dhar feature, which overlooked Naushera and was the key to the
defence of Naushera valley, was held by 1 Rajput under the command of

Lieutenant Colonel Guman Singh. Though Usman had anticipated the