Page 148 - Leadership in the Indian Army

sited his battalion to defend the two approaches from Mirpur and Kotli,
with the Battalion HQ at the crossroads in the middle. Due to the distance
between the companies, the positions did not have mutual support, a factor

which proved critical during the enemy attack on Jhangar.
Since the beginning of December, the enemy had been harassing the
garrison at Jhangar with fire from mortars and small arms, but it was
difficult to gauge their strength. To get a clearer picture, Kullar sent a
company down the Mirpur road on 9 December, and ordered the company
occupying Pir Matalsi to cover their move. It had barely advanced about
750 metres when it came under effective fire and one man was killed. The

company was ordered to return and soon afterwards, the enemy launched an
attack. The attacking troops reached within 50 metres of the defences on Pir
Matalsi before they were beaten back, leaving 40 dead. During the attack,
Kullar was at Pir Matalsi with Lieutenant Colonel Rawind Singh Grewal,
MC, standing beside him. Grewal was commanding 3 Para Mahratta Light
Infantry (MLI), which was part of 77 Para Brigade. As soon as Usman was

moved from 77 to 50 Para Brigade, Grewal warned his officers that they
should be prepared to join 50 Para Brigade, as he had a hunch that their
erstwhile Commander would ask for them. He had gone over to Jhangar to
directly assess the situation, and what he saw there was not very
encouraging. On his return he ran into Major General Kalwant Singh in the
officers’ mess at Jammu. Kalwant was in a happy frame of mind, and asked
Grewal about the chances of 1 Para Punjab holding out at Jhangar. Kalwant

was visibly annoyed when Grewal told him that considering their depleted
strength the chances were very slim.
Besides a lack of troops, the brigade was severely handicapped by lack of
intelligence about the enemy. Their main source of information were
refugees, who were prone to exaggeration and therefore unreliable. The
local Muslim population had been alienated due to years of neglect by the

Dogra rulers, and their loyalties had been subverted by Pakistani
propaganda, which made them believe that the raiders would liberate them.
Apart from the Kashmir valley, Hyderabad was also proving to be a trouble
spot and required troops. This meant that there were hardly any that could
be spared for the defence of the Jammu sector. It was not surprising
therefore, that repeated requests for reinforcements by local commanders
kept being turned down by Delhi. The fate of Jhangar was sealed even

before it came under attack.