Page 147 - Leadership in the Indian Army
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communication,  and  ordered  the  troops  to  return  to  Jhangar.  This  was
                accomplished  on  28  November.  If  Kalwant’s  decision  to  rush  to  Kotli
                without  securing  his  open  flank  by  taking  Mirpur  was  surprising,  his

                decision to fall back to Jhangar immediately after capturing Kotli was even
                more so. In the event, Mirpur was lost. And thereby hangs a tale. The wife
                of one of the Maharaja’s ADCs—she was also reportedly one of his many
                mistresses—lived in Kotli. It was rumoured that a large treasure belonging
                to the State was kept in Kotli. Kalwant Singh’s haste to relieve Kotli was
                probably  due  to  these  two  factors  rather  than  for  tactical  reasons.  And
                though the lady and the treasure might well have been saved, the lives of

                several hundred men and the honour of several thousand women, were lost.
                Of  course,  Kalwant  Singh  blamed  the  delay  in  capturing  Kotli  for  the
                misfortune which befell Mirpur, saying that a more energetic commander
                than Paranjpe would have succeeded in saving both.
                   After falling back from Kotli, 50 Para Brigade occupied the townships of
                Jhangar and Naushera: 1 Para Punjab was asked to hold Jhangar, while the

                Brigade  HQ  and  the  second  battalion  were  at  Naushera.  Soon  after
                returning to Naushera, Brigadier Paranjpe was hospitalised and had to be
                replaced. He had been keeping indifferent health for some time due to an
                injury he had sustained while in Gurdaspur. Brigadier Mohammed Usman,
                who  was  then  commanding  77  Para  Brigade,  was  transferred  to  relieve
                Paranjpe as Commander 50 Para Brigade.
                   Though 50 Para Brigade was holding Naushera, the enemy was occupying

                several  positions  around  it,  particularly  in  the  north. Usman  realised  the
                inherent danger of enemy presence in the close vicinity of Naushera, and
                made several attempts to remove them and clear the road towards Chingas.
                But the troops available to him were inadequate for the task, and he did not
                succeed. The situation in Jhangar was also causing concern. Besides 1 Para
                Punjab,  which  had  just  450  men,  the  garrison  comprised  a  troop  of  7

                Cavalry and a platoon of Mahar medium machine-gunners. There were also
                some personnel from Signals and the Field Ambulance.
                   The enemy could advance to Jhangar from Kotli as well as Mirpur, and 50
                Para Brigade had not only to cover both these approaches, but also the road
                to Naushera. A line of hills ran along the route from Kotli to Jhangar and
                continued to Naushera. The road towards Mirpur was dominated by the Pir
                Matalsi ridge, and its occupation was essential for the defence of Jhangar.

                Lieutenant Colonel G.I.S. Kullar, who was commanding 1 Para Punjab, had
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