Page 151 - Leadership in the Indian Army
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With many places around Naushera in enemy hands and the threat of a
                major assault ever present, 50 Para Brigade was in a precarious situation.
                The morale of the garrison was at rock bottom. After the bitter communal

                frenzy  of  Partition,  some  of  the  troops  were  unsure  of  the  loyalty  of  a
                Muslim  commander.  The  situation  was  not  improved  by  the  exaggerated
                accounts of the enemy given by men of 1 Para Punjab, which made them
                seem invincible. Usman was faced with a daunting task. He not only had to
                frustrate the designs of the enemy, but also win the confidence of his own
                troops.  He  set  about  it  in  real  earnest,  and  his  forceful  personality,  good
                personnel  management  and  professional  acumen  soon  changed  the

                situation. He introduced the greeting ‘Jai Hind’ in the brigade and directed
                that all orders and briefings be in Hindi at all levels of command. So that
                the other units in Naushera were not demoralised by their tall tales, 1 Para
                Punjab was sent to Beripattan. It also did the unit good to be trusted with an
                independent task after its defeat at the hands of the enemy.
                   The  defence  of  Naushera  was  given  due  attention.  Apart  from  the

                perimeter, troops were deployed to man pickets on  all important features
                overlooking  and  dominating  the  approaches  to  the  town.  The  line  of
                communication  to  Beripattan  was  often  cut  by  the  enemy,  and  this
                interfered with the movement of supplies and reinforcements. To clear the
                way, road-opening parties had to be sent from both directions. Usman was
                not one to passively sit and wait for the enemy. He started ‘reconnaissance
                in force’, which entailed hitting the enemy whenever he could. To free the

                infantry for such limited offensive actions, he used administrative elements,
                such as drivers, to man the perimeter by day. It was with one such offensive
                that  he  captured  Kot  and  Pathradi,  thus  clearing  the  enemy  from  the
                immediate vicinity of Naushera defences and reducing the threat to the line
                of communication back to Beripattan. The story of how or why Kot was
                captured is interesting.

                   In January 1948 Lieutenant General K.M. Cariappa had taken over DEP
                Command (later Western Command) from Lieutenant General Sir Dudley
                Russell. Soon after assuming command, he visited Naushera. Accompanied
                by Major (later Lieutenant General) S.K. Sinha, he landed at the airstrip in
                Naushera in a two-seater Auster. Usman received the Army Commands and
                took him around the brigade. Before he left, Cariappa turned to Usman and
                said that he wanted a present: he wanted Usman to capture Kot, which was

                the highest feature in the range of  hills overlooking the Naushera valley.
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