Page 111 - Trilateral Korea Japan U.S. Cooperation
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Concessions from North Korea through coercive diplomacy
            are means through which an effective diplomatic approach
            occurred to a limited extent, and it is the only sort of approach
            that has a realistic chance for breakthroughs to occur moving
            forward. It was no accident that Admiral Harry Harris, the
            four-star admiral of the U.S. Pacific Command, was inserted
            into the ambassadorship to South Korea instead of the
            Australian ambassadorship. Making Stephen Biegun both
            the U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Negotiations even
            as he served as Deputy Secretary of State sent another strong
            message of the importance that the Trump administration
            placed on addressing the North Korean crises.


            The successes of the past Trump administration reinforce the
            merits of a robust approach to the Kim Jong-Un regime. It
            disrupted the usual pattern of North Korean saber-rattling
            brinkmanship. Typically, the totalitarian dictatorship there
            would: 1) precipitate a crisis; 2) draw in who they want to
            the negotiating table; 3) negotiate benefits for the regime; 4)
            swallow these benefits; and then 5) break the agreement, after
            which they restart the cycle. When President Trump escalated
            exchanges above the North Korean regime, it disrupted the
            usual pattern.

            When North Korea threatened to shoot down any plane that
            entered or came near its airspace, the U.S. sent F-35 fighter
            jets screaming along the Korean Peninsula, daring North
            Korea to follow through on its threat. North Korea was unable
            to sustain its threat given its less advanced air defenses.


            The remaining batteries of the Terminal High Altitude



        110  Section II : Human Rights, Abductees, Forced Repatriation of Refugees and the Regional Implications
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