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would often admit to crimes they did not commit.”
A number of feeble excuses have been raised against such
prosecution. For example, federal prosecutors have claimed
that North Korean defectors who testify would be in jeopardy.
The truth of the matter is that they are already targeted by the
North Korean regime. For example, the top targets on North
Korea’s public assassination list are North Korean defectors
who speak out against the gross injustices in North Korea.
Furthermore, the names and identities of testifying defectors
can be protected through various means. For example, their
faces can be blurred out, their names can be blacked out,
and their voices can be distorted beyond recognition. They
may be referred to as Witness 1, Witness 2, Witness 3, etc.
Defectors have already shown themselves willing to take the
risks involved in speaking out against this state of what I have
called “rightlessness.” Such an objection would be applied
pretextually to all mass atrocity prosecutions.
Another objection is that the North Korean defendants would
not show up in court. A similar objection was made against
the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia. Every defendant was captured,
which numbered 16. Even if particular defendants do not
show up, it is still possible to indict them while they are absent.
Then, warrants for their arrest may be issued, which would
put tremendous pressure on them, as they may then be legally
captured. It would cramp their willingness to travel due to the
concern about arrest. The North Korean government greatly
fears this prosecution option. Thus, it can apply massive
leverage, which may be used in diplomatic negotiations.
Chapter Seven : Threats from North Korea: A Personal View 115