Page 120 - Trilateral Korea Japan U.S. Cooperation

Overcoming the North Korean Rinse and
Repeat Negotiating Cycle

Fortunately, the North Korean demands for preconditions
to be met before coming to the negotiating table would
fall characteristically into their repeated schemes to wrest
benefits without reciprocal responses on their part. This
cyclical behavior was detailed earlier in this paper. As a result,
rewarding them just to come to the negotiating table is not
only inadvisable, it would follow a sizable list of failures
along these very lines. For example, George W. Bush’s
administration tried making concessions such as dropping
sanctions and the prosecution of North Korea’s cyberheist of
Banco Delta. The U.S. Department of the Treasury stated on
September 15th 2005:

“Banco Delta Asia has been a willing pawn for the
North Korean government to engage in corrupt financial
activities through Macau, a region that needs significant
improvement in its money laundering controls,” said
Stuart Levey, the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism
and Financial Intelligence (TFI). He also noted that “By
invoking our USA Patriot Act authorities, we are working to
protect U.S. financial institutions while warning the global
community of the illicit financial threat posed by Banco Delta
Asia.”

As usual, North Korea pocketed the benefits and did not
reciprocate. Similarly, the 1994 Geneva Protocol agreement
during the Clinton administration resulted in North Korea

Chapter Seven : Threats from North Korea: A Personal View 119