Page 42 - Trilateral Korea Japan U.S. Cooperation

• Maintaining Stability on the Korean Peninsula: On one hand,
China must manage the uncontrollable uncertainties of
North Korea, and on the other, it needs to manage North
27
Korea’s instability. Either way, risks originating from
North Korea make China’s long-term competition with the
U.S. difficult and increase management costs. For China
to become a superpower by the 2050s, unintended crises
28
on the Korean Peninsula must be avoided. Thus, keeping
uncertainties and instabilities on the Korean Peninsula at a
manageable level is an important balance in China’s policy
towards the Korean Peninsula.

China is actively embracing North Korea, and vice versa.
Although the “new experiment” in 2018 did not lead to a
grand compromise with the United States, it restored relations
with China and tied China as its ally. The “thick comradely
trust and special intimacy” between Kim Jong-Un and Xi
Jinping continue their relationship. North Korea has firmly
defended China’s core interests and criticized U.S. policies as
intended to contain China. Desperate North Korea knows
well that China needs North Korea for competition with the
U.S. and is actively using this to expand its strategic space.

27 Jeremy Page, “China Prepares for a Crisis along North Korea Border,” Wall Street Journal (July 24, 2017); Yun
Sun, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Contingency Planning on North Korea (April 12, 2018).
28 The most critical factor will be the U.S. military response. See Jooyoung Song, “Understanding China’s
Response to North Korea’s Provocations: The Dual Threats Model,” Asian Survey, Vol.51, No.6 (2011).

Chapter Two : North Korea’s Nuclear Threat and China’s Backing for North Korea 41