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situations. The process of creating scenarios takes into
              account variables such as political-military relations
              between nations, military/nuclear strategies, nuclear and
              conventional military capabilities, troop/weapon system
              effectiveness, environmental factors, and crisis development
              processes. Even after the creation of a scenario, strategic
              risk assessment through situation monitoring is required.
              “Pol-Mil games” and Tabletop Exercises (TTX) led by U.S.,
              South Korea, and Japan experts are required to develop,
              verify, and improve different scenarios.


            •   Direct Engagement with China: despite North Korea’s
              increasing nuclear capabilities, threat assessments have
              mainly concentrated on direct threats to the U.S., Japan,
              or South Korea. Nuclear crises on the Korean Peninsula
              now involve regional actors in addition to North and South
              Korea; the assessment that the chess match has become
              a multilateral game of poker, or worse, Russian roulette,
              because of the rise in nuclear actors underscores the serious
              risks that China could pose. In addition to the various risk
              scenarios that have been discussed above, each nation must
              secure the means and strategies for direct engagement with
              China.

            •   Securing Adaptability: Since it is impossible to predict the
              future precisely, we must respond to changes adaptively.
              While it is ideal to respond to as many scenarios as possible
              at once, there is no silver bullet or panacea. Instead, we
              must constantly identify gaps in our current readiness and
              make up for vulnerabilities. The alliances of the Pacific
              and Atlantic regions, with the United States at the center,



        48  Section I : North Korea-China Relations: How and Why Does Beijing Protect and Empower Pyongyang?
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