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2.2 Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS)
            A SIS is a set of devices and software that perform one or more
            Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs). Each SIF has a stated Safety
            Integrity  Level  (SIL)  that  is  related  to  the  acceptable  levels  of
            probability  that  the  SIF  will  NOT  work  when  demanded  (when
            needed).

            Instruments and control systems are tested and certified against
            IEC standards, to determine the level of risk reduction they offer,
            when used in a SIF.
            MHI's Safety Control System

            DIASYS Netmation4S has a unique design that allows integration of
            the DCS and SIS. This enables a flexible arrangement in terms of
            both cost and security. Furthermore, integration of DCS/SIS brings
            several  merits,  such  as  common  software  tools  and  spare
            components.
            Multi-level Hardware Redundancies
            To reduce or mitigate the impact of device failures on the safety of
            the process, redundancies are introduced at various levels of a
            control loop. This example shows how a critical protection function
            is  implemented  through  triple  redundant  Transmitters,
            Controllers,  and  IO  modules.  When  there  is  a  failure  or
            disagreement  between  redundant  devices,  majority  voting  (e.g.
            2oo3) is used to determine output.

            2.3 Lock-Out-Tag-Out (LOTO) Feature
            LOTO is a safety feature is available in DCS operation station, that
            allows  lock-out  of  a  field  device  for  maintenance  and  make  it
            impossible for others to operate the device without removing the
            LOTO first.
            2.4 Setpoint Supervision
            While operators are allowed to enter set points as per process
            requirements, strict upper and lower limits are placed to restrict
            the operator from entering parameters which can destabilize the
            process.


            2.5 Preventing Override of Protection Functions
             Plant operators are not allowed to override safety interlocks or
            setpoints  from  operator  stations.  Any  modification  to  those
            setpoints and logics are accessible only to the Engineer through the
            Engineering Station (located in a separate Engineering Room)

            As  process  plants  continue  to  increase  in  size  and  complexity,
            instrumentation and control systems continue to help construction,
            operation and maintenance personnel to better monitor, analyse
            and control plant processes, thereby making them a safe place to
            work.





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