Page 30 - Five Forces of Americanisation Richard Hooke 04072025 final post SDR1

The UK Defence Industry in the 21 Century
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The Five Forces of Americanisation

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However, whilst a potentially important structure in de-escalating tension across the world, trade is
also the common major preoccupation for BRICS member countries. Indeed, at this stage in President
Trump’s administration, international trade seems to have undermined any Russian calls for collective
aggression against the West.
“An overtly anti-Western policy will not prevail in the BRICS, as the overwhelming majority of
states there are not interested in aggravating relations with the West.”
(Fyodor Lukyanov Chair, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (Russia) Council of Foreign
th
relations, 7 November, 2024)
Yet whilst a new, more aggressive US trade policy at first seemed likely to provoke a retaliatory BRICS
response, Wall Street’s reaction may ultimately prove decisive in guiding world leaders towards a
constructive approach to conflict prevention and resolution, pre-empting any consideration of military
action. To date, financial markets across the world have reacted adversely to the USA’s proposed new
tariff regime. At the time of writing, the US legal system has rejected their claim to legitimacy. Here,
it seems, idealism faces a new definition of realism. In place of deterrence, one can detect the
pragmatism of world trade and its effect on interdependent national economies, regardless of their
political persuasion.
But America First is reconfiguring US trade policy in other assertive and pragmatic ways. Prioritising
military support and foreign aid in accordance with America First reflects a form of coercive
dealmaking that has featured prominently in US political exchanges for over ten years.

”We will continue to be the leading European ally within NATO, as one of only two Allies (with the
US) that can bring to bear nuclear, offensive cyber, precision strike weapons and fifth-generation
strike aircraft across the NATO region”
“NATO adapted to the threat of extremist terrorists after 9/11, declaring Article V and developing
its expeditionary role, and since 2014 has successfully re-invigorated its defence and deterrence
in response to the threat posed by an aggressive Russia.”
(UK Ministry of Defence: “Defence in a Competitive Age” March, 2021)
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In the 21 Century, the global trade in arms has brought about the evolution of a separate, distinctive
but complementary international structure, based on the pragmatism of hard power: weapon systems
and military equipment and services. This framework arises from common weapon systems and
equipment, procured from similar sources or suppliers and required to address similar or shared
threats. And, since investment in defence is a whole-government or cabinet-level decision, it is based
on the practicalities of national and international political, commercial, financial, social and economic
realities.
The acquisition of equipment usually spans more than one government’s or head of state’s term.
Military sales do not take place in a vacuum. They envisage a conflict, usually with a possible aggressor
and with a specified term in mind. Equipment needs updating, refreshing, replacing or supplementing
over a period of this term and beyond. The buyer–seller relationship is intimate and enduring. It has
to be.
“In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the In-Kingdom Industrial Participation programme continues to
make good progress consistent with our long-term strategy, whilst supporting the Kingdom’s
National Transformation Plan and Vision 2030.”
(BAE Systems plc 2024 Half Year Report)
For the exporting country, it creates a tangible level of authority underpinning effective foreign
influence and diplomacy as well as practical opportunities, via international defence systems and
equipment development programmes, to strengthen existing or develop new military and diplomatic
alliances, as well as to explore interoperability and, significantly, to reduce costs.

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07/07/2025 Richard Hooke 2025