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The UK Defence Industry in the 21  Century
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                                            The Five Forces of Americanisation

                 ii.  Confirming an effective oversight regime to control and deploy as necessary the UK defence
                     and security technology/IP base

                       Both  to  audit  the  UK’s  current  “stock”  of  technology/IP,  together  with  any  restrictions
                       regarding its use, and to evaluate the control systems governing the sharing or transfer of such
                       technology or IP within companies operating across national borders and between companies
                       as  part  of  a  merger,  acquisition  or  some  form  of  strategic  alliance.  This  may  require  the
                       development of a UK version of the US ITAR. It may also require a visible change in governance,
                       applying equally to US and other overseas countries owning defence assets in the UK and
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                       similar to the USA’s “Special Security Agreement” (“SSA”) .
               2. Sustaining an effective Defence Industrial Base (DIB)

                  The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of the DIB (the ability to supply ammunition,
                  equipment and technical support) in the UK’s foreign affairs and ultimately to its own security. It
                  follows that any changes in the nation’s DIB should be intentional.

                  It  therefore  follows  that  an  understanding  and  appreciation  of  other,  broader  but  significant
                  factors  should  inform  R&T,  sourcing  and  procurement  policy  in  future:  from  force  projection,
                  scarcity  or  differentiation  to  sources  of  national  competitive  advantage  (eg:  supplying  Anti-
                  Submarine Warfare sonobuoys to the US Navy), export potential, derivative innovation, intellectual
                  property or knowhow, and the effect on national defence industrial infrastructure (eg: professional
                  and regulatory bodies, UK legal and financial structure). The USA’s Department of Defense (“DoD”)
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                  February 2022 report on the “State of Competition within the Defense Industrial Base”  is a useful
                  reference. It not only sets out the criteria by which M&A transactions should be assessed from a
                  DIB  perspective  but  also  provides  guidance  on  how  and  when  “the  antitrust  agencies  can
                  implement behavioral or structural remedies”. One Defence has broadened the scope
                  i.   Foresight and prevention – sustaining effective oversight and being proactive in taking steps
                       to anticipate, avoid or even exploit the opportunities for change provoked by potential
                       corporate failure
                       Ministers should not be expected to block or review mergers or divestments already publicly
                       announced. In a country that values its defence capabilities and knows how to use them on
                       the  world  stage,  any  potential  corporate  activity  needs  to  be  fully  considered  by  all  the
                       appropriate stakeholders. Early. Hence there needs to be an “early warning” system.

                       Whilst supplier monitoring is common practice in most business corporations, according to its
                       Chief Executive, the UK Civil Service has been an exception. The collapse into liquidation of
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                       government contractor Carillion plc  in January, 2018 is a notable example of both the need
                       to be vigilant in assessing the potential for corporate failure (even if it applies to a company
                       listed on the London Stock Exchange) and of the potential for even the most senior levels of
                       Civil Service management to ignore evidence of a developing crisis.
                       Both Ultra and Cobham had been heading for either restructuring or repositioning for several
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                       years.  This  could  be  detected  from  public  sources ,  let  alone  from  attending  investor
                       presentations and roadshows given by the respective management teams.
                       The solution ultimately prescribed by the principal shareholders in both cases was an urgent
                       and dramatic intervention: to replace the Chair and most of the board and to appoint a new
                       team with a mandate to realise or rebuild value quickly. This is symptomatic of a governance
                       regime  that  has  failed.  In  both  cases,  the  need  for  recovery  or  repositioning  could  be
                       anticipated  some  years  in  advance.  Such  anticipation  would  be  enabled  by  consistent
                       monitoring, using both quantitative and qualitative data routinely made available to the public
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                       and  used  systematically  by  financiers  and  company  analysts .  This  should  provide  the


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               07/07/2025                                                                                                                                   Richard Hooke 2025
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