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The UK Defence Industry in the 21  Century
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                                            The Five Forces of Americanisation

               The sales of Cobham and that of Ultra two years later to the same US fund, raised questions regarding
               the need to assess the suitability, from both a CMA and national security perspective, of a prospective
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               buyer of a UK defence company. Given the analysis conducted by Bain & Co it is unlikely that a private
               equity firm, generally attracted to a deal by the prospect of arbitrage, would qualify. However, this
               point was made very clearly (without access to Bain & Company’s 2024 Private Equity Report) to the
               CMA in the evidence submitted by a “third party”.
                     “… Advent’s status as a private equity investor means that it is not a suitable owner for Cobham’s
                     air-to-air refuelling business, because:
                     “(i) Advent has no history of owning defence businesses, and has a history of acquiring businesses
                     with an objective of exiting them quickly, and potentially breaking them up;
                     “(ii) Advent is unlikely to make the required long-term investments into required technology,
                     equipment, and research and development, in order to support, maintain and upgrade the air-to-
                     air refuelling business.”
                     AI Convoy Bidco - Cobham: A report to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy & Industrial
                     Strategy on the anticipated acquisition by Al Convoy Bidco Limited of Cobham Plc: Competition &
                     Markets Authority; 29 October, 2019)
               When Andrea Leadsome, the Secretary of State for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy looked at
               the CMA assessment, she was just over two months into her six-month stint (between 24 July 2019
               until 13 February, 2020) in office. She did not find these arguments persuasive and approved the
               transaction.
               She had, however, received some guidance beforehand, in the form of a quoted “UK Government
               spokesman” who announced that “This is a commercial matter for the companies involved”. However,
               having made that statement, the government subsequently requested that the CMA should review
               the proposed transaction citing national security concerns.

                     “Just before 10pm on a Friday (just before Christmas) is an odd time for this kind of thing to be
                     announced. One defence analyst remarked that it was as if the government rather wanted no-one
                     to notice what had happened.
                     “It says something of the sensitive nature of Cobham’s business that much of the published version
                     of  the  competition  regulator’s  (CMA)  report  on  the  takeover  was  simply  blacked  out.  In  one
                     unedited passage of the report, the Ministry of Defence said if the deal went ahead there was “a
                     risk  that  the  institutional  framework  and  safeguards  required  by  the  government’s  security
                     framework may be undermined”.”
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                     (Dominic O’Connell, BBC News Business Correspondent 21  December, 2019)
               Could the MoD have predicted or anticipated Cobham’s vulnerability to a private company takeover?
               If so, what steps could it have taken to improve the outcome in the national interest? What other
               agencies could or should have been involved in any intervention?

               Bankers, investors, equity analysts, financial advisers, industry regulators, customers, suppliers and
               other  stakeholders  routinely  look  for  early  signs  of  corporate  failure  in  business.  By  reviewing
               information in the public domain, they can combine analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data
               to  assess  the  company’s  health.  In  particular  to  detect  any  symptoms  of  potential  failure:  from
               refinancing, restructuring or forced sale to bankruptcy. The manner of Cobham’s sale and subsequent
               break-up has been widely regarded as corporate failure and the signs were evident as far back as 2008,
               when Goldman Sachs published its buyout model. Frequent changes in the leadership team led to
               discontinuity and inconsistency in decision-making, policy and oversight.
               The  major  benefit  provided  by  actively  monitoring  the  management  and  performance  of  major
               government contractors like Cobham is that it provides early warning of potential problems, creating
               an opportunity for intervention and either preventative or mitigating action. Defining the nature of
               intervention can be challenging but engaging with the supplier regarding the concerns is a useful place
               to  start.  The  US  DoD  has  developed  a  model  based  on  its  accumulated  experience  of  informal
               direction.

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