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                  258                               Corporate Finance                      BRILLIANT’S


                      (ii) If the dividend is declared:

                                  1                                    6   P 1
                          100 =       ×  6 + P 1              100 
                               1+ 0.10                                 1. 10
                       110 = 6 + p                           P  = 110 – 6
                                    1                             1
                       P  = ` 104
                           1
                      (iii) Price of Equity Share would be ` 104, if the dividend is paid. Hence, number of shares
                  to be issued:

                               I   E   nD 1   20, 00, 000   10, 00, 000 6, 00, 000 
                           n            =
                                   P                    104
                                    1
                              16 00 000, ,
                                          ,
                          n            15 385  shares to be issued.
                                104
                      Note: Dividend paid 1,00,000 shares at ` 6 per share = ` 6,00,000.
                  MM Hypothesis: A Critique                   MM hm`nmo[W{gg: EH$ g_rjm
                      MM Hypothesis argues that the dividend      MM hm`nmo{W{gg Zo VH©$ àñVwV {H$`m {H$ \$_© H$s
                  decision of the firm is irrelevant  in the sense  d¡ë`y ñdV§Ì hmoVr h¡, Ho$ VmËn`© _| \$_© Ho$ {S>{dS>oÝS> {S>grOZ
                  that the value of the firm is independent of it.
                                                              Aàmg§{JH$ hmoVo h¢Ÿ& BZdoñQ>g© {S>{dS>oÝS> Ed§ A{Zª½g Ho$
                  The investors are indifferent between dividend  [aQ>oÝeZ Ho$ _Ü` VQ>ñW hmoVo h¢Ÿ& Eogm _w»`V: BÝQ>aZc
                  and  retention  of  earnings.  This  is    mainly
                  because  of  the  balancing  nature of  internal  \$m`ZopÝg¨J ([aQ>oÝS> A{Zª½g) Ed§ EŠgQ>aZc \$m`ZopÝg¨J
                  financing  (retained  earning)  and  external  (~mha go \$ÊS> àmá H$aZm) Ho$ ~¡copÝg¨J ZoMa Ho$ H$maU
                  financing  (raising  the  funds  externally).  hmoVm h¡Ÿ& Š`m MM hm`nmo{W{gg {S>{dS>oÝS> {S>grOZ Ed§
                  Whether  the  MM  hypothesis  provides  a   d¡ë`yEeZ Ho$ ~rM Ï`moao{Q>H$c [acoeZ{en Ho$ {cE EH$
                  satisfactory  framework  for  the  theoretical  g§VmofOZH$ T>m§Mm àXmZ H$aVr h¡? `h Bg àH$ma {Z^©a
                  relationship between  dividend decision  and
                  valuation will depend on whether external and  H$aVm h¡ {H$ BÝQ>aZc Ed§ EŠgQ>aZc \$m`ZopÝg¨J dmñVd
                  internal  financing really  balance each  other.  _o| EH$-Xygao H$mo ~¡coÝg H$aVr h¡ `m ZhtŸ& `o {ZîH$f©
                  These  conclusions are  based  on  unrealistic  AdmñV{dH$ _mÝ`VmAm| na AmYm[aV h¡Ÿ& {OgHo$ n{aUm_ñdê$n
                  assumptions. As a result, the conclusion that  `h {ZîH$f© {ZH$mcm J`m {H$ {S>{dS>oÝS> no_oÝQ²>g Ed§ \$m`ZopÝg¨J
                  dividend  payments  and  other  methods  of
                                                              H$s AÝ` _oWS> XmoZm| EH$-Xygao H$mo nyU©V: à{V g§Vw{cV
                  financing exactly offset each other and hence
                                                              H$aVo h¢ Ed§ Bg{cE {S>{dS>oÝS> H$s Aàmg§{JH$Vm EH$ àopŠQ>H$c
                  the irrelevance of dividend is not a practical
                  proposition. The  validity of the MM approach  àm°nmo{OeZ Zht h¡Ÿ& MM Ñ{ï>H$moU H$s d¡YVm Xmo ‘m¶Zo
                  is open to question on two counts:          aIZo Ho$ {bE Iwbm h¡…
                      (a) Imperfection of capital market.         (a) H¡${nQ>c _mH}$Q> H$m Båna\o$ŠeZ&
                      (b) Resolution of uncertainty.              (b) A{ZpíMVVm H$m àñVmdŸ&
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