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                  362                               Corporate Finance                      BRILLIANT’S


                  stew of one horse and one rabbit. Taxes are large  Q>¡³g A{YH$ h¡ VWm do {ZpíMV h¢ O~{H$ ~¢H$aßQ>gr
                  and  they are  sure, while  bankruptcy is  rare  Xþb©^ h¡ VWm {‘ba Ho$ AZwgma BgH$s H$‘ S>oS>-d¡Q>
                  and, according to Miller, it has low dead-weight
                                                              bmJV| h¢& BgHo$ AZwgma CÝhm|Zo gwPmd {X¶m {H$ ¶{X
                  costs. Accordingly,  he suggested  that  if  the
                  trade-off theory were true, then firms ought to  Q´>oS>-Am°’$ ϶moar ghr Wr Vmo g§ñWmAm| H$s S>oãQ> ñVa
                  have much higher debt levels than we observe  A{YH$ hmoZm Mm{hE Wm {OVZm dmñV{dH$Vm ‘| h‘ XoIVo
                  in reality. Myers was a particularly fierce critic  h¢& ‘m¶g© A‘o[aH$Z ’$m¶Z|g Egmo{gEe§g H$s ~¡R>H$ ‘|
                  in  his  Presidential address  to  the  American  CZHo$ Aܶjr¶ g§~moYZ ‘| {deof ê$n go H$R>moa AmbmoMH$
                  Finance  Association meetings  in  which  he  Wo {Og‘| CÝhm|Zo àñVmd {X¶m {Ogo CÝhm|Zo 'noqH$J Am°S>©a
                  proposed what  he called ‘the  pecking order
                  theory’. Fama and French criticized both the  ϶moar' H$hm& ’$m‘m VWm ’«|$M Zo {d{^ÝZ ê$nm| ‘| Q´>oS>
                  trade-off theory and the pecking order theory  Am°’$ ϶moar VWm noqH$J Am°S>©a ϶moar XmoZm| H$s AmbmoMZm
                  in different ways. Welch has argued that firms  H$s& doëM Zo VH©$ {X¶m {H$ g§ñWmE§ ñQ>m°H$ àmBg Ho$
                  do not undo the impact of stock price shocks as
                                                              PQ>H$m| Ho$ à^md H$mo g‘má Zht H$a nmVr h¢ O¡gm CÝh|
                  they should do under the basic trade-off theory
                  and so the mechanical change in asset prices  ‘yb Q´>oS>-Am°’$ ϶moar Ho$ A§VJ©V H$aZm Mm{hE VWm Bg{bE
                  that  makes  up for  most of  the  variation  in  AgoQ> àmBgog ‘| ‘¡Ho${ZH$b n[adV©Z H¡${nQ>b ñQ´>³Ma ‘|
                  capital structure.                          A{YH$m§e do[aEeZ H$aVm h¡&
                      Despite such criticisms, the trade-off theory  BZ AmbmoMZmAm| Ho$ ~mX ^r Q´>oS>-Am°’$ ϶moar H$m°nm}aoQ>
                  remains  the dominant  theory of  corporate  H¡${nQ>b ñQ´>³Ma H$m à‘wI {gÕmÝV ~Zm ahm O¡gm ‘w»¶
                  capital structure as taught in the main corporate  H$m°nm}aoQ> ’$m¶Z|g Q>o³ñQ>~w³g ‘| n‹T>m¶m J¶m h¡& gm‘mݶV…
                  finance  textbooks. Dynamic  versions of  the  ‘m°S>b Ho$ S>m¶Zm{‘H$ dO©Ýg S>mQ>m H$m {‘bmZ H$aZo ‘| n¶m©á
                  model generally seem to offer enough flexibility
                  in matching  the data  so, contrary to Miller's  bMrbmnZ àXmZ H$aZo dmbo àVrV hmoVo h¢, {‘ba Ho$ ‘m¡{IH$
                  verbal argument, dynamic trade-off models are  VH$m] Ho$ {dnarV S>m¶Zm{‘H$ Q´>oS>-Am°’$ ‘m°S>ëg H$mo àm¶mo{JH$
                  very hard to reject empirically.            ê$n go {ZañV H$aZm ~hþV H${R>Z h¡&
                  4. Agency Theory                            4. EO|gr ϶moar

                      Agency theory is the branch of financial    EO|gr ϶moar ’$m¶Z|{e¶b BH$moZm°{‘³g H$s emIm h¡
                  economics that  looks at  conflicts of  interest  Omo g‘mZ g§n{Îm¶m| ‘| {d{^ÝZ é{M dmbo bmoJm| Ho$ ~rM
                  between people with different interests in the
                  same assets.                                ‘V^oX H$mo XoIVr h¡&
                      This most importantly means the conflicts   g~go ‘w»¶ ê$n go {ZåZ{b{IV Ho$ ~rM ‘V^oX h¢…
                  between:
                  (a) shareholders and managers of companies  (a) H§$nZrO Ho$ eo¶ahmoëS>g© VWm ‘¡ZoOg©&
                  (b) shareholders and bond holders.          (b) eo¶ahmoëS>g© VWm ~m§S> hmoëS>g©
                      The  theory  explains  the  relationship    ¶h ϶moar {gÕm§Vm| O¡go {H$ eo¶ahmoëS>g© VWm EH$
                  between principals, such as a shareholders and  EO|Q> (O¡go {H$ H§$nZr Ho$ ‘¡ZoOg©) Ho$ ~rM g§~§Y H$m dU©Z
                  agents (such as a company's managers). In this
                                                              H$aVr h¡& Bg g§~§Y ‘| à‘wI H$m¶© g§nÝZ H$aZo Ho$ {bE EH$
                  relationship the principal delegates (or hires)
                                                              EO|Q> H$mo gm¢nVm (¶m {Z¶w³V H$aVm) h¡& ¶h ϶moar Xmo {d{eï>
                  an agent to perform work. The theory attempts
                  to deal with two specific problems:         g‘ñ¶mAm| na H$m¶© H$aZo H$m n«¶mg H$aVr h¡…
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