Page 269 - Records of Bahrain (3) (i)_Neat
P. 269
British influence and foreign interests, 1904-1906 259
him, with the Custms difficulties, is so remote. Suspicions injuri-
ous to our other interests in the Persian Gulf might bo aroused
thereby ”.
4. I would next refer to paragraph 6 of my letter No. 123 of nth March.
. This was written immediately on conclusion of operations at Bahroin. I had
doubts as to whether Government would consider that the measures taken were
completed and sufficient, and had told Sheikh Esa so. My opinion that Sheikh
Esa was hopeless as a Ruler had been strengthened, and l suggested to Govern
ment that we should strike while the iron was hot and should inform Sheikh Esa
that we " propose to make the following arrangements in which ho is expected to
acquiesce.”
The measures thus proposed by me were clearly put forward as a comple
tion or continuance of the coercion, to be applied, l hoped, almost at once 1 and
l submit that in the face of the Secretary of State's dictum that the control of
the Customs should not be effected in immediate connection with tho recent
incidents, I could not properly have included a repetition of any proposal in that
direction among the reforms which l recommended Government to impose upon
Sheikh EsaTorthwith.
I thought in fact that it was now accepted that we must content ourselves
with the hope that the desired changes in this connection would eventually be
brought about by the personal influence over the Sheikh which Government's
newly appointed Agent at Bahrein might be expected gradually to acquire.
This reform of the Customs through British supervision is a paramount objec
tive which neither the Political Agent nor l have lor a moment lost sight of or
ceased to discuss, but while I am personally hopeful, l cannot say that the latest
Bahrein reports give cause for immediate encouragement.
Captain Pridcaux has his heart thoroughly in his work and is doing his (
utmost, but he has a task before him which would have been a sufficiently diffi- ]
cult one even for <t Political Officer possessing exceptional colloquial proficiency ;
in Arabic; and he has further had to content! with initial difficulties which it is \
necessary that Government should know, and take into account.
He has taken up Arabic since his appointment to Bahrein, but naturally
cannot yet communicate with the Sheikh except through a third party, and this
question of a medium of communication has, from the beginning been a difficult
one; for the worthy old munshi of the Agency, on whom the duty should pro
parly fall, besides being a Shiah by religion, is in other respects not a persona
grata with the Sheikh. This was fully realised, but suitable men are very diffi
cult to get and it was only recently that Captain Prideaux was able to obtain from
India the services of a young man of good education and antecedents possessing
a good knowledge of Arabic. It will be some little time however before he can
become thoroughly versed in tho work required of him.
Apart from this Captain Pridcaux was formerly, as the Government of India
may remember, First Assistant in this Residency, and while holding that post,
was sent on an important mission to Bahrein by Colonel Meade to remind the
Sheikh generally of his obligations and to put pressure on him with regard to
several matters of which settlement was badly required.
The recollection of his former visit on the above duty was perhaps in the
first instance hardly the best recommendation for a new Political Agent to the
Sheikh’s confidences.
While reiterating therefore that Captain Prideaux is working thoroughly
well and doing his utmost to further the policy of Government, I can but expect
that some little time must elapse before he can hope to acquire, if indeed it is
possible for any one to do so in the ease of Sheikh Esa, that position of friendly
and imperceptible domination which is the only kind of influence that can be
really efficacious in a case of a long standing intractability like the present.
47