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6 ANNUAL .RETORT OF THE PERSIAN GULF POLITICAL RESIDENCY
principal supporter of Nnsir i-Dowan, but when the actual attack was mad0 1.
was not found present, and the enemy were led by Mullah Ewnz, Nosh./*
Dowan’s nominee as headman of Kamarij. The attack was well covered by
mountain guns, and most of the enemy ran away before the attuck was fU)jv
developed. A few men, however, held their ground with great pertinacity tin
the 65th Coke’s Rifles effected an ascent of an almost precipitous aide path, and
appeared on the summit, at which point they lost one man killed and one
wounded.
Karaarij was then occupied, and entrusted to Mulla Quli, as guardian of
the infant son of Eaidar Khan, the last headman of Kamarij who was success-
ful in maintaining good order in the valley. The capture of tbe Kamarij Pass
ended any possibility of resistance to the progress of our troops to Shiraz, and
the military problems confronting the force were henceforth confined to admin
istrative matters, roadmaking, the safeguarding of the Lines of Communica-
lion, and such subsidiary measures as were from time to time found necessary
to keep the rebel leaders well out of reach of the road. At the close of tbe year
the Governor was engaged in organising an attack by local riflemen on y,^
Khidar’s position at Khawiz.
Thus the year closed with the hostile organisation completely broken as
far as Kazerun, and tbe town open to occupation at any moment. From
Bushire to the foot of tbe Kamarij Pass a good camel road had been construct
ed ; and the hostile chiefs were fugitives in the hills with only a petty follow-
in^. The political problems presented by the situation were even at
thiB 6tage complicated and embarrassing, the Political officers being
confronted at every turn with questions of an administrative charac
ter, and being obliged by their instructions to avoid the assumption
or any powers beyond those immediately necessary for the purposes
of the force, and to evade all commitments which would place difficulties in
the way of a return to Persian administration. It will readily be imagined
that this task was not an easy one in a tract where no settled government had
been seen for years, and where the keenest desire of the inhabitants was to sec a
strong authority established to decide all their vexed questions. A feature
of the expedition, which of incalculable value on the political side, was its
remarkable degree of independence of local resources in the matter of supply
and transport The Persians early realised that neither they, their animals,
nor their supplies were in auy sense indispensable to the expedition, and
this feeling naturally made them far more confident, and ut the same time less
grasping, in their dealings with the force, than would otherwise have been the
ease. As a result of this and of tactful handling by Political and Supply
officers, local supply was effectively organised, and provided the following
totals to the end of the year :—
Sheep and goals 2,515
Camels 82
Bhoosa . 6,652 maumk-
Firewood 6,412 >•
Barley 103
"Wheat 120
Dates 101
The total British casualties to the end of the year were as follows :—
Killed. Wounded. Died of woaudi. Died of due**-
I
British officers • 1 1
British other ranks
Indian officers ' • 1 27 b
Indian other ranks 17 56 4 12(1
Followers* • • ••
400
Total 17 58 4
ifk,