Page 587 - PERSIAN 8 1912_1920_Neat

7
FOR THE rKA.R. 1018.
It should bo noted that these figures include tl e cusualties due to the
world-wido epidemic of influenza.
The history of tho expedition during the period under review appears to
justify tho following conclusions
firstly, the largo majority of the inhabitants of Southern Pcisia bjo
absolutely sick of disorder and insecurity. This feeling, enlorced by the weak­
ness due to tho ravages of the influenza, and the difficulty of obtaining fresh
Bupplic3 of ammunition, and especially by the collapse of the German power,
broke the back of the anti-British coalition animated by Wassmuss.
Secondly, tho traditional Persian foar of artillery fire, which had been
slightly weakened in this region owing to the ineffective nature of the artillery
occasionally brought out by tho Persian authorities, was found to be as strong
pb ever as soon as the effectiveness of t£ie firo was perceived.
Thirdly, the local villagers and tribesmen, though no doubt they would
be led by their religious and patriotic feelings to view a British defeat with
pleasure, are not actuated by these feelings to any practical extent as soon as
the British are in force : there is no reluctance whatever to enter into friendly
and even cordial relations.
Fourthly, the influence of the Tehran Government may be described as
almost entirely negative. None of the leading men has (or had hitherto) the
slightest compunction in disobeying orders either from tho Provincial or the
Central Government, or in withholding revenue ; and the prospect of tbe
appointment of local Persian authorities was nowhere welcome. At the same
time opposition to the British expedition would unquestionably Lave been
intensified in the absence of any proclamation from the Prime Miuister.
Wassmuss went to Kazerun at the commencement of the agitation, but
does not appear to hare been very warmly
German activities.
welcomed, either by Nasir-i- Dewan or by
Soulet. He was not present at any of the fighting near Shiraz. Under the
orders of Government he and Oertel were informed of the conclusion of
the Armistice and offered the following conditions , viz., immediate repatriation
if they came in at once, in tbe alternative treatment as prisoners of war if
they were captured later. They sent prevaricating replies, and did not come
in. 'Ihe matter was not of great importance, as Wassmuss' influence had
practically disappeared.
The events at Shiraz itself during the summer have already been described.
Previous to the rising in Kay, several
Sbirac and Pari.
successful punitive operations had been
carried out to the East and North of Shiraz. Simultaneously with the attacks
on Shiraz, detached posts at Abadeh and Dchbid were invested. The former
was in very serious danger, which was only averted by a vgry stubborn defence.
Negotiations for its relief were undertaken with the B&fchtiari IQians, but it
was relieved in time by a column from Shiraz. During the operations.against
houlet-ed-Douleh he was superseded as Dkhani of the Kashgai by his half
brother, Sardar Ehtisharo. The latter conducted a campaign against him in
the autumn, with the assistance of a force of Indian troops and South Persia
Kmes, without whom he would undoubtedly have been unable to accomplish
anything They succeeded in driving him away from his headquarters at
*iruzabad with heavy loss, but their operations were paralysed by the influenza
epidemic, which decimated the column, and thev were unable to continue
««campaign. Soulet was, however, rendered quite impotent to affect the
progress of the Bushire force
The situation was transformed in this quarter by the expedition of the
Behbob&n and Krtetta. Bakhtiari Khans, with the invaluable
*«• t> assistance of a section of the 31st Mann.

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