Page 61 - U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
P. 61

A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Second Edition.


            the  CEP  because  it  voluntarily  self-disclosed,   equaled  $93,940;  (5)  the  steps the company  had
            fully  cooperated,  and  timely  and  appropriately   taken to enhance its compliance program and its
            remediated pursuant to the CEP. In addition, the    internal  accounting  controls;  (6)  the  company’s
            company was the subject of a parallel investigation   remediation,  including  but  not  limited  to
            by the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO)   terminating  all  of  the  executives  and  employees

            for legal violations relating to the same conduct   who  were  involved  in  the  misconduct;  and
            and  committed  to  accepting  responsibility  with   (7) the fact that DOJ had been able to identify and
            the SFO (the company subsequently entered into      charge the culpable individuals.
            a deferred prosecution with the SFO and agreed to
                                                                CEP Declination Example 3
            pay approximately £2.07M of gross profits arising
                                                                     In  2019,  DOJ  declined  prosecution  of  a
            from the payments to the director).
                                                                publicly traded technology services company.

            CEP Declination Example 2                           DOJ’s  investigation  found  that  the  company,
                 In  2018,  DOJ  declined  prosecution  of      through  its  employees,  authorized  its  agents
            an   insurance    company    incorporated   and     to  pay  an  approximately  $2  million  bribe  to
            headquartered  in  Barbados.    DOJ’s  investigation   one  or  more  government  officials  in  India  in
            found  that  the  company,  through  its  employees   exchange for securing and obtaining a statutorily
            and  agents,  paid  approximately  $36,000  in  bribes   required  planning  permit  in  connection  with  the

            to  a  Barbadian  government  official  in  exchange   development  of  an  office  park,  as  well  as  other
            for  insurance  contracts  resulting in approximately   improper  payments  in  connection  with  other
            $686,827  in  total  premiums  for  the  contracts  and   projects  in  India.  Despite  the  fact  that  certain
            approximately  $93,940  in  net  profits.    Specifically,   members of senior management participated in

            in or around August 2015 and April 2016, high-level   and  directed  the  criminal  conduct  at  issue,  DOJ
            employees of the company took part in a scheme to   declined prosecution of the company based on an
            pay approximately $36,000 in bribes to the Minister   assessment of the factors set forth in the CEP and
            of Industry in Barbados, and to launder the bribe   the  Principles  of  Federal  Prosecution  of  Business
            payments into the United States.                    Organizations, including but not limited to: (1) the
                 Despite  the  high-level  involvement  of      company’s  voluntary  self-disclosure  within  two

            corporate  officers  in  the  misconduct,  DOJ      weeks of the Board learning of the criminal conduct;
            declined  prosecution  based  on  a  number  of     (2) the company’s   thorough    and   comprehensive
            factors,  including  but  not  limited  to:  (1)  the   investigation; (3) the company’s full and proactive
            company’s  timely,  voluntary  self-disclosure  of   cooperation in the matter (including its provision
            the  conduct;  (2)  the  company’s  thorough  and   of all known relevant facts about the misconduct)

            comprehensive  investigation;  (3)  the  company’s   and its agreement to continue to cooperate in
            cooperation (including its provision of all known   DOJ’s ongoing investigations and any prosecutions
            relevant facts about the misconduct) and its        that might result; (4) the nature and seriousness of
            agreement  to  continue  to  cooperate  in  DOJ’s   the offense; (5) the company’s lack of prior criminal
            ongoing  investigations  and/or  prosecutions;      history; (6) the existence and effectiveness of the
            (4) the company’s agreement to disgorge to DOJ      company’s  pre-existing  compliance  program,

            all profits it made from the illegal conduct, which     as  well  as  steps  that  it  had  taken  to  enhance  its
                                                                                                                      53
   56   57   58   59   60   61   62   63   64   65   66