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A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Second Edition.


            Justice  Manual, 297   provide guidance  regarding       As   these   factors   illustrate,   in   many
            the resolution  of cases involving  corporate       investigations  it  will  be  appropriate  for  a
            wrongdoing. The Principles of Federal Prosecution   prosecutor  to  consider  a  corporation’s  pre-
            of Business Organizations recognize that resolution   indictment conduct, including voluntary disclosure,
            of corporate criminal cases by  means other than    cooperation,  and  remediation,  in  determining

            indictment, including non-prosecution and deferred   whether  to  seek  an  indictment.  In  assessing
            prosecution  agreements,  may  be  appropriate  in   a  corporation’s  cooperation,  prosecutors  are
            certain circumstances. Ten factors are considered in   prohibited   from   requesting   attorney-client
            conducting  an  investigation,  determining  whether   privileged  materials  with  two  exceptions—when
            to  charge  a  corporation,  and  negotiating  plea  or   a corporation or its employee asserts an advice-
            other agreements:                                   of-counsel defense and when the attorney-client

                 •   the nature and seriousness of the offense,   communications were in furtherance of a crime or
                    including the risk of harm to the public;
                                                                fraud.  Otherwise,  an  organization’s  cooperation
                 •   the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the
                    corporation, including the complicity in, or the   may  only  be  assessed  on  the  basis  of  whether
                    condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate   it disclosed the relevant facts  underlying an
                    management;
                                                                investigation—and  not  on  the  basis  of  whether
                 •   the corporation’s history of similar
                    misconduct, including prior criminal, civil, and   it has waived its attorney-client privilege or work
                    regulatory enforcement actions against it;  product protection. 298
                 •   the corporation’s willingness to cooperate with
                    the government’s investigation, including as   DOJ FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy
                    to potential wrongdoing by the corporation’s
                    agents;                                          The  FCPA  Corporate  Enforcement  Policy
                 •   the adequacy and effectiveness of the      (CEP),  contained  in  the  Justice  Manual,  provides
                    corporation’s compliance program at the     that,  where  a  company  voluntarily  self-discloses
                    time of the offense, as well as at the time of a
                    charging or resolution decision;            misconduct,  fully  cooperates,  and  timely  and
                 •   the corporation’s timely and voluntary     appropriately  remediates,  there  will  be  a
                    disclosure of wrongdoing;                   presumption that DOJ will decline prosecution of
                 •   the corporation’s remedial actions, including   the company absent aggravating circumstances. 299
                    any efforts to implement an adequate and
                    effective corporate compliance program      CEP declinations are public and available on the
                    or to improve an existing one, to replace   Fraud  Section’s  website  at  https://www.justice.
                    responsible management, to discipline or
                    terminate wrongdoers, or to pay restitution;  gov/criminal-fraud/corporate-enforcement-
                 •   collateral consequences, including         policy/declinations. Aggravating circumstances
                    whether there is disproportionate harm to   that  may  warrant  a  criminal  resolution  instead
                    shareholders, pension holders, employees,
                    and others not proven personally culpable, as   of  a  declination  include,  but  are  not  limited
                    well as impact on the public arising from the   to:  involvement  by  executive  management  of
                    prosecution;
                                                                the  company  in  the  misconduct;  a  significant
                 •   the adequacy of remedies such as civil or
                    regulatory enforcement actions, including   profit  to  the  company  from  the  misconduct;
                    remedies resulting from the corporation’s   pervasiveness  of  the  misconduct  within  the
                    cooperation with relevant government
                    agencies; and                               company; and criminal recidivism. 300    Even where
                 •   the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals   aggravating  circumstances  exist,  DOJ  may  still
                    responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance.
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