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end of the war. 21                                    submit the dispute to arbitration, the British government placed  the
            6-6.  Nationality as a Concept of  International Law.  a.   matter  before  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations.  France  there
            General  concepts.  The  preceding  discussion  has  been   argued that the dispute arose out of a matter solely within its domestic
                                                                 jurisdiction,  and the Council requested an advisory opinion of the Per-
            directed toward an appreciation of the inherent semantic
                                                                  manent  Court  of  International Justice  on  the  preliminary question
            difficulties involved in the study of nationality and to not-   whether the dispute between France and Great Britain was "by  interna-
            ing those problems which appear to be, but are not, within   tional law solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction (article 15, paragraph 8
            the ambit of the international law of nationality. For the   of the Covenant). . . ."I
            purposes of a study of substantive principles, the content   The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the ju-
                                                                 risdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon
            of  the international law of nationality may be said to be
                                                                  the development of international relations. Thus, in the present state of
            those rules of law which define the relative rights of states   international law,  questions of  nationality are,  in  the opinion of  the
            regarding the relationship between themselves and foreign   Court, in principle within this reserved domain.
            persons, a relationship which is governed, at least in part,   For the purpose of the present opinion, it is enough to observe that it
            by  rules of  international law. 22 The international law of   may well happen that, in a matter which, like that of nationality, is not,
                                                                 in principle, regulated by international law, the right of a State to use its
            nationality is not concerned with all the rights and duties
                                                                 discretion is nevertheless restricted by obligations which it may have un-
            of  states, but only those which concern the relationship   dertaken towards other States. In such a case,jurisdiction which, in prin-
            between one or more states [the subjects of international   ciple, belongs solely to the State, is limited by rules of international law.
            law]  and  foreign  persons  [the  objects  of  international   ...
                                                                   [The Court held that the nationality decrees had to be considered in
            law]. 23
                                                                 the light of a number of international agreements invoked by  France
              It is through the medium of their nationality that individuals can nor-  and Great Britain; for that reason, the dispute did not arise out of a mat-
            mally enjoy benefits from the existence of the Law of Nations. This is a   ter solely within France's  domestic jurisdiction.]
            fact which has consequence over the whole area of International Law. 24        *
            It is obvious that while mental segregation of municipal
                                                                 CONVENTION  ON  CERTAIN  QUESTIONS  RELATING  TO
            and international law of nationality is essential to clarity of   THE CONFLICT OF NATIONALITY LAWS
            thought, physical segregation of  the two in discussion is       %gned at The Hague, April  12, 1930
            impossible. This results from the fact that it isnecessary to   179 L.N.T.S.  89, 5 Hudson, Int'l  Legislation 359
            consider simultaneously the rules which  the sovereigns   Art. 1. It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its
                                                                 nationals. This law shall be recognized by  other States in so far as it is
            have  imposed  upon  their  subjects and  the effect these
                                                                 consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the
            rules have upon the relative rights of various sovereigns;   principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality.
            and conversely, the effect the rights of various sovereigns   Art. 2. Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality
            as to one another has had upon the rules which each en-   of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of
            forces on its own subjects. In the words of a United States   that State.
            Court of  Appeals:  "Each  country determines for  itself   Art. 3. Subject to the provisions of the present Convention, a person
                                                                 having two or more nationalities may be regarded as its national by each
            who are its nationals, subject to certain limitations on ex-   of the States whose nationality he possesses.
            pansive claims imposed by  international law."  25
                                                                     (2)  What limits does international law, particularly
              b.  Determination  of  nationality  under  International
                                                                 "international  custom"  and  "the  principles  of  law
            Law.
                                                                 generally recognized with regard to nationality,"  impose
                (1)  Limitations imposed by  International Law.
                                                                 on  the  power  of  states  to  legislate  on  matters  of  na-
               NATIONALITY DECREES IN TUNIS AND MOROCCO 
        tionality?  Harvard  Research in  hternational Law  sug-
                         (GREAT BRITAIN v. FRANCE)
                    Permanent Court of International Justice, 1923 
  gested in  1929 that the power of a state to confer its na-
                  P.C.I.J.,  Ser. B,  No. 4;  1 Hudson, World Ct.Rep.  143 
  tionality was "not  unlimited,"  observing that although it
              [Decrees promulgated in Tunis and Morocco on November 8, 1921,   may be dficult  to specifjr the limitation imposed by inter- ,
            declared every person born in Tunis or the French zone of Morocco of   national  law  on  the power  of  a state to  confer  its  na-
            parents at least one of whom was a foreigner who had also been born   tionality, "it  is obvious that some limitations do exist."  26
            there to be,  subject to certain conditions of proof, a French national.
            The British government objected to the enforcement of the demes (par-  (3)  The Hague Codification Conference of 1930 was
            ticularly with respect to forcible induction into military service) against   unable to agree upon a more precise formulation than that
            persons who  were  the descendants of  British  subjects and therefore,   adopted in Article 1of the Convention on Conflict of Na-
            under British law, themselves British subjects. France having refused to   tionality Laws quoted above. However, a number of par-
               21.  Terhoch  v.  Daudin  et  Assistance  Publique  France,  [I9471   ticipating governments asserted that states were not obli-
            Ann.Dig.  121 (No. 64).                              gated under international law to recognize nationality con-
               22.  See P. Weis, supra, note 7, at 34-35 for the complexities that   ferred upon a person in the absence of  some generally
            may arise in attempting to outline clearly the scope of such a law.   recognized relationships or co~ection between the per-
               23.  As  noted  in  chapter  1 and  throughout  this publication,  the
            above subject-object distinction is still generally observed in nationality   son and the state claiming him as its national. The Ger-
            matters. See generally, H. Briggs,  The Law of Nations, 64, 93-98  (2d   man Government, for example, stated:
            ed.  1952).
               24.  1 L. hpenheim, supra, note 8 at 640.            26.  Harvard  Research  in  International  Law,  The Law  of  Na-
               25.  United States ex re/.Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 898 (1943).   tionaliry, Art. 2, 23 Am.  J. Int7Spec. Supp. 11, 24-27 (1929).
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